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We present a new automated, objective and intuitive scoring technique to measure the content of central
bank communication about future interest rate decisions based on information from the Internet and
news sources. We apply the methodology to statements released by the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) after its policy meetings starting in 1999. Using intra-day financial quotes, we find that short-term
nominal Treasury yields respond to changes in policy rates around policy announcements, whereas
longer-dated Treasuries mainly react to changes in policy communication. Using lower frequency
data, we find that changes in the content of the statements lead policy rate decisions by more than
a year in univariate interest rate forecasting and vector autoregression (VAR) models. When we estimate
Treasury yield responses to the shocks identified in the VAR, we find communication to be a more
important determinant of Treasury rates than contemporaneous policy rate decisions. These results
are consistent with the view that the FOMC releases information about future policy rate actions in
its statements and that market participants incorporate this information when pricing longer-dated
Treasuries. Finally, we decompose realized policy rate decisions using a forward-looking Taylor rule
model. Based on this decomposition, we find that FOMC statements contain significant information
regarding both the predicted rule-based interest rate and the Taylor-rule residual component, and that
content of the statements leads the residual by a few quarters.
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After years of intentional opacity, central banks in advanced economies have exerted signiﬁcant
eﬀorts to enhance the transparency of their communication to market participants (Mishkin [2007]).
At least since the early 1990s, monetary policy communication has often been used to signal future
policy rate decisions, for example by detailing the central banks’ own economic projections on which
these decisions are partly based. Forward policy communication can be thought of as an additional
policy instrument that central banks can use to inﬂuence longer-term nominal interest rates beyond
the conventional targeting of short-term interest rates through open market operations (Bernanke
[2004], Woodford [2005]). Indeed longer-term yields reﬂect, albeit imperfectly, market expectations
for the path of short-term rates, and thus they respond to credible communication of future policy
decisions.1
With short-term interest rates close to the zero-nominal lower bound in many advanced economies
for most of 2009, central bank communication has arguably become an even more important in-
strument. Several major central banks have actively used their communication to exert additional
stimulus at a time in which conventional policy tools have been severely constrained. In the United
States, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced its intention to maintain “low
levels of the federal funds rate for some time” in its December 18, 2008 policy statement. Perhaps
even more forcefully so, other central banks, including the Bank of Canada, the Swedish Riksbank
and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, have also signalled future policy intentions through oﬃ-
cial communication. For example, after lowering its policy target to essentially zero, the Bank of
Canada in its April 21, 2009 statement announced its conditional commitment to “hold current
policy rate until the end of the second quarter of 2010.”
Although the theoretical contributions to the analysis of information and communication have been
signiﬁcant in the economic literature, the empirical research has not produced comparable insights,
partly because of the complexity involved in quantitatively evaluating ﬂows of verbal information
in a manner that is at the same time objective, intuitive, and replicable.2 This paper attempts to
ﬁll such gap by advancing a class of automated measures of monetary policy communication, and it
applies these measures to “FOMC statements”, which are released by the Committee after its mon-
etary policy meetings. These statements are of particular interest for two separate reasons. First,
the texts represent an almost-ideal set of observations for an empirical analysis of communication:
The structure of the text is fairly comparable over time; the statements are available for a relatively
long period of time; ﬁnally, their release dates are fairly evenly spaced in time. Second, according
to popular ﬁnancial press and ﬁndings of previous literature, ﬁnancial market participants pay close
attention to their content, and changes in their wording elicit signiﬁcant reactions in U.S. and other
1The imperfect response of long-term yields owes to the presence of term premia due to time-varying risk or other
factors in the pricing of long-dated assets (see for example, Fama and Bliss [1987]).
2For a review of recent literature on central bank communication see Woodford [2005] and Blinder, Ehrmann,
Fratzscher, Haan, and Jansen [2008].
2ﬁnancial markets.3
Text and words are not readily quantiﬁed in terms of intensity and direction of meaning, which
in what follows will be referred to as semantic orientation. Interpretation of non-quantitative
information is naturally subjective, and the same set of words can have very diﬀerent meaning and
intensity depending on the context of use and reader. In this paper, we borrow a set of tools from
computer science and computational linguistics speciﬁcally designed to address these measurement
issues and based on an intuitive, but information-theoretic, principle. We present two classes of
automated scoring algorithms. The ﬁrst score—the Google semantic orientation score—is directly
based on the text of the FOMC statements, and is calculated using information from the Internet via
Google-engine searches. The second score—the Factiva semantic orientation score—is constructed
using discussions of FOMC statements from newspapers, journals and newswires that are included
in the Dow Jones Factiva news database on days of announcements.
The construction of the Google semantic orientation score works as follows. Given two words repre-
senting opposing concepts (an antonymy, say, “hawkish” versus “dovish”), the semantic orientation
of a sentence x (say, “Pressures on inﬂation have picked up”) is measured by the relative frequency
with which the string x and the word “hawkish” jointly occur, and the frequency with which string
x and the word “dovish” jointly occur. If the string x co-occurs more often with the word “hawk-
ish” than with the word “dovish”, then it seems intuitive to attribute to that sentence a relatively
more hawkish score (and vice versa). Contributions in the linguistic literature have provided an
information-theoretic foundation to this approach.4 Since it is not possible to directly compute
joint frequencies of co-occurrence in the “population” of Internet webpages (at least unless massive
computing resources are employed), we empirically implement the score using searches on Google.
Indeed, hit counts on joint searches (for example, a search of the string x and the word “hawkish”)
represent empirical estimates of the population frequencies. Although the Google-based semantic
score uses an extremely large set of information, it comes at the cost of not accessing potentially
valuable information on the webpages, and on relying on the Google’s proprietary algorithm to
construct the hit counts of web-searches (not publicly disclosed). We therefore supplement the
Google-based score, with another implementation measured on news from Factiva that we can
directly access and analyze.
In the Factiva-based analysis we ﬁrst subset news from the database that have headlines involving
the Federal Reserve or the FOMC, around times of FOMC meetings and record all the sentences in
the news. We then automatically analyze the text to construct a measure of semantic orientation
of the FOMC announcement. Following the reasoning described above, given a sentence s from
3See for example Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack [2004], or the recurring Wall Street Journal column “ Parsing the
Fed”, which analyzes the content of each sentence of the statement relative to the most recent one “for clues about
where interest rates may be headed”.
4The concept of pointwise mutual information (PMI) employing information retrieval (IR) is discussed in the
methodological part of the paper and, more in detail, in the companion Appendix to this paper. Relevant references
in the linguistics literature include Church and Hanks [1990], Turney [2001, 2002] and Turney and Littman [2002].
3a news article in the set of all text, the occurrence of the word “hawkish” as opposed to the
word “dovish” within s justiﬁes the attribution to s of a relatively more hawkish score.5 By
comparing the frequency of diﬀerent antonyms—i.e. the mutual association of word pairs such
as “hawkish/dovish”, “loose/tight” to words such as “Fed or “interest rates”—we can generate
scores for the large universe of news recorded in the Factiva database immediately before and after
each FOMC announcement. Based on these we construct measures of semantic orientation and of
(unanticipated) changes in these measures around the announcements.
After building these two automated scores, we study their properties as measures of monetary
policy communication in a high- and low-frequency identiﬁcation analysis. The sample starts
in May 1999, when the FOMC begun systematically releasing statements after all of its policy
meetings. We ﬁnd that yields on short-term Treasury securities mainly respond to unexpected
changes in the fed funds target rate during narrow time windows around the release of FOMC
announcement. Instead, yields on longer-dated Treasuries only react to changes in the content of
the statements, with 2-year Treasuries displaying the most pronounced yield responses.
In lower frequency data, we analyze the relation between the semantic scores and short-term rates
within both a univariate and a vector autoregression (VAR) model.6 The univariate model uses
the semantic scores to directly forecast short-term rates—the federal funds and the 3-month Libor
rate—at diﬀerent horizons while conditioning on the information available to investors about future
rates right ahead of the policy announcements.7 The VAR model, instead, includes the federal funds
rate and the semantic scores, as well as measures of inﬂation and economic activity. Parameter
estimates of the univariate model imply that the scores have predictive power for short-term rates
up to two years out. According to estimates of the VAR model, a one standard deviation increase
in the scores implies a hump-shaped response of the federal funds rate with a peak of about 30 basis
point after about one year. We then estimate the response of Treasury yields to the shocks identiﬁed
in the VAR. Based on the forecast error variance decompositions, we ﬁnd that the semantic scores
have been more important than actual policy rate decisions as determinants of Treasury yields in
the sample, consistent with the high-frequency results.
Finally, in order to analyze the type of information contained in the statements, we decompose
realized policy rates with a forward-looking Taylor rule estimated using real-time forecasts of the
output gap and inﬂation as proposed by Orphanides [2001]. Based on this decomposition we
ﬁnd that the semantic scores contain signiﬁcant information regarding both the predicted and the
5As we describe in more detail in Section 2, the Factiva approach allows for a high degree of precision in the
textual searches. For example, we can easily accommodate for negations of our matches in the analysis (for example
a match of “not hawkish”).
6In the paper we ﬁnd that the Google-based scores is somewhat noisier that its Factiva counterpart. The low-
frequency results discussed here refer to this latter score. See the conclusions for more discussion on this point.
7As implied by quotes on futures contracts delivering at the corresponding time horizon. We consider Libor rates
to study the scores’ predictive power for future short-term rates beyond the ﬁrst few months. Indeed, while the
liquidity of Eurodollar futures contracts—settled on future Libor rates—that expire beyond one-year is relatively
high, the liquidity of federal funds rate futures drops sharply for expirations beyond the ﬁrst few months.
4residual component of the rule-implied interest rate decisions. In addition, the semantic scores lead
the residual component of the Taylor-rule by a few quarters.
These ﬁndings based on our automated semantic measures support the view that the FOMC alters
the content of the statement several months ahead of taking policy rate actions, and consistently
longer-term nominal Treasury yields respond to changes in the content of the statements. The
automated approach to central bank communication that we present in this paper is new in the
economic literature and we think that it has several advantages relative to previous literature. First,
it does not rely on subjective ratings of text by researchers, like for instance in Romer and Romer
[2004] or Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack [2004]. At the same time, by specifying an ex-ante metric
along which analyzing the content of the statement—in particular, one can focus on the degree of
“hawkishness” of the statement as predictor of future policy rate hikes—we depart from black-box
methodologies, such as latent analysis methods, which deliver ﬁndings that are hard to interpret
economically, and are often silent about policy communication prescription.8
The remaining of paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the methodological descrip-
tion of the automated measures set forth in this paper, and apply them to the FOMC statements
(with additional detail presented in the companion Appendix). In Section 3 we present the data
used in the empirical analysis. In Section 4 we investigate the eﬀects of communication on asset
yields using a high-frequency identiﬁcation. In Section 5 we analyze the low-frequency properties of
our linguistic scores: we ﬁrst evaluate their forecasting power in a univariate setup; we then analyze
the empirical link between the linguistic scores and the systematic and non-systematic components
of future and current policy decisions, as determined by Taylor rules; ﬁnally, we analyze the rela-
tion between the scores, policy actions and Treasury rates in a recursive VAR model. Section 6
concludes.
2 Automated measures of the FOMC statement
Over the course of the past decade, FOMC statements have arguably been among the most impor-
tant means used by Committee members to communicate to investors about monetary policy. The
statements are short in length: In our sample, the core of the statements is composed on average
of about six sentences, each of which about 25 words long, expressing succinctly the FOMC’s ra-
tionale for the most recent policy action, or lack thereof, and an assessment of the risks to its goals
of “price stability and maximum sustainable employment”going forward.9 In order to put the the
measurement approach in a sharper perspective, we brieﬂy discuss the role of FOMC statements,
8See for example Boukus and Rosenberg [2006] for an application of latent semantic analysis to FOMC minutes.
G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson [2005] apply latent factor analysis to yield responses around FOMC announcement
to indirectly measure the impact of communication on yields.
9The sample period starts in May 18, 1999 and ends in December 16, 2008. See Section 3 for additional detail.
In the paper we will refer to the FOMC statement as its “core” text, that is, excluding the preamble describing the
policy rate action taken at the meeting, and the concluding list of the voting members’ roll call.
5and of central bank communication more in general, as monetary policy instruments. We then turn
to the measurement approach.
Central bank communication Central banks in developed economies often use their oﬃcial
communication to inﬂuence market participants’ views about the likely path of future policy actions,
and to align these views to their own. Communication can be used to improve the understanding
of long-run policy objectives, helping central banks to achieve their long-term goals, most notably
anchoring inﬂation expectations (Bernanke [2004]).10 As agents’ expectations concerning future
policy rate moves help determine the paths of aggregate prices and quantities, central banks can
achieve Pareto-superior equilibria when they control these expectations by committing to speciﬁc
policy paths (Woodford [2005]).11
In practice, central bank communication increases the eﬀectiveness of monetary policy by inﬂuenc-
ing long-term interest rates beyond the immediate setting of short-term policy rates, as long-term
rates depend not just on the current, but on the entire expected path of short-term rates up to
term premia. Because long-term rates generally have a very important role in households’ and busi-
nesses’ economic decisions—for example, through mortgage or corporate bond rates—by inﬂuencing
market expectations central bank communication can enhance the eﬀectiveness of their policies.12
When policy rates are constrained by the zero-nominal bound communication becomes an even
more important tool. For example, as shown by Eggertsson and Woodford [2003], in standard
macroeconomic models with a complete set of frictionless ﬁnancial markets, communication about
the future policy path (so long as it is perceived as being credible) is among the very few policy
instruments available to central banks to exert monetary stimulus at the zero-nominal bound.13
Measurement of the FOMC statement Consistent with an interpretation of central bank
communication as an expectation management tool, we construct a set of measures of the content
of FOMC statements that attempt to extract information about future policy rate actions. There
10Among other important reasons discussed in Bernanke [2004] for central bank communication, and transparency
more in general, are that systematic communication increases the accountability of monetary authorities, a partic-
ularly important goal given their central role and political independence. In addition, because unexpected policy
actions come with large asset price reactions, as well as with large “winners” and “losers”, communication may help
improve the overall stability of the ﬁnancial system.
11With time-varying objectives and preferences that are not directly observed by other agents, central banks can use
communication to signal the future policy path, therefore aligning agents’ expectations to the central bank’s preferred
policy path. Of course, under rational expectations, future policy moves have to be conﬁrmed in equilibrium, implying
an empirical correlation between words and future actions. We ﬁnd signiﬁcant evidence of such correlation in Section
5.
12Short-term rates clearly matter directly for economic decisions. For example, the average prime rate on business
loans in the U.S. is priced oﬀ the intended federal funds rate with a spread of 300 basis points (H.15 Federal Reserve
Statistical Release). The term of business loans is in general shorter than the term on other loan categories, most
notably residential mortgage and commercial real estate loans.
13In particular, Eggertsson and Woodford [2003] show that nonconventional policies, such as purchases of ﬁnancial
assets by central banks in the open market, are neutral in many standard macroeconomic models. In these models,
long term yields are only pinned down by the expected path of short term rates and monetary policy cannot aﬀect
term- or risk-premia by other means. Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack [2004] present some empirical evidence against
these stylized predictions.
6are at least two more reasons to focus on this dimension of communication in addition to what just
discussed. First, it is directly suggested by the “balance of risk” of the statements.14 Second, as
evidenced by popular ﬁnancial press, investors attempt to extract information about future policy
actions from the statements, therefore guaranteeing suﬃcient data on news outlets and the Internet
that we can draw upon to construct our automated measures. In what follows, we deﬁne measures
of the policy stance, or policy “hawkishness”, and its intensity based on the FOMC statements.
The measures should produce a high score for a hawkish statement—one that hints to a possible
increase in the target funds rate—and a low score for a dovish statement, that is, one that implies
a decrease in the target rate.
The inherent diﬃculty of measuring words’ meaning, discourse orientation, and intensity is the
primary challenge in constructing these measures. For the sake of concreteness, suppose that we
were set to analyze the information content regarding future rate decisions implied by the two
phrases: “Pressures on inﬂation have picked up”, statement of March 22, 2005—call this string of
text X; and “Inﬂation pressures seem likely to moderate over time”, December 12, 2006—call it
string X0.15 Although it seems natural to interpret the former phrase as being more hawkish than
the latter, no clear metric exists prima facie to assess the two.
A heuristic measurement approach In order to emphasize the advantages of our automated
scores, we discuss next a simple approach to go about the problem. Let us assign to each sentence




   
   
1 if the sentence indicates, or suggests, an increase in inﬂation;
−1 if the sentence indicates, or suggests, a decline in economic activity;
0 if neutral.
(1)
According to the operator deﬁned in (1), the score HI(X) would clearly be a 1, whereas HI(X0)
would possibly be a 0. A heuristic approach such as the one just described has advantages and
14The FOMC statement has included both direct and indirect references to future policy rate actions. Until January
2000 the statement contained an explicit reference to subsequent policy moves called policy “bias”. This was later
replaced with a “balance of risks” that only indirectly discusses policy moves through an assessment of the weights
given to the objectives of price stability and growth. A direct reference to policy rate actions was reintroduced
in statements during the “zero-nominal bound” periods of 2003-2004 and after December 2008, for example, by
noting “that policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period” in the August and December 2003
statements. Kohn [2005] discusses potential advantages of providing only indirect references to future policy actions.
According to his view, an indirect discussion of future policies through policy objectives provides a clearer indication
that the commitments to future policy moves are state-contingent, rather than unconditional binding promises that
cannot take into account future evolution of policy-relevant variables.
15The strings X and X
0 are, respectively, part of the following two sentences: “Though longer-term inﬂation
expectations remain well contained, pressures on inﬂation have picked up in recent months and pricing power is more
evident.”and “However, inﬂation pressures seem likely to moderate over time, reﬂecting reduced impetus from energy
prices, contained inﬂation expectations, and the cumulative eﬀects of monetary policy actions and other factors
restraining aggregate demand.”
7shortcomings.16 It is an intuitive and a simple measure of the orientation of a sentence. However,
it coarsely approximates intensity and relies on an arbitrary and subjective judgment by the re-
searcher, and it is, thus, diﬃcult to interpret or replicate across scorers. Consider, for instance,
the alternative interpretation of the score for X0 as being equal to −1 on the grounds that lower
inﬂationary pressures can be associated with a decline in aggregate demand, and that this scenario
might be unwarranted when inﬂation is below a central bank’s target. In addition, the categories in
(1) might not always be mutually exclusive as, for example, in the case of a discussion of stagﬂation.
Putting these concerns aside, one might ask how accurately such a score describes the monetary
policy stance of FOMC statements. We discuss this issue in more detail in the next sections, but as
a preview, we construct a time series of the heuristic score, by applying the scheme (1) to the set of
sentences in each FOMC statement in our sample, and then by averaging within each statement.17
Figure 1 shows the heuristic score alongside the intended (target) federal funds rate, and the rate
implied by the fourth quarterly Eurodollar futures contract (taken 20 minutes after the FOMC
announcement), which, as discussed in Section 3, is a market based measure of short-term interest
rates at the one-year horizon. From a descriptive standpoint, the heuristic score appears to lead the
target rate by a few quarters, consistent with the idea that the score measures information about
future policy actions. Statements with a dovish stance appear to lead subsequent policy rate cuts,
while statements with a hawkish stance have been followed by subsequent rate hikes. The heuristic
score is also fairly correlated with the contemporaneous level of the Eurodollar futures rate (about
50 percent in levels), although the score has been somewhat more volatile than this rate at times.
The automated measurement approach The novel application that we propose in this paper
is to assign to each sentence an objective and automated score able to capture the semantic orien-
tation of the statement, or one of its parts, along a “hawkish–dovish” metric (or alternative metrics
deemed appropriate—we experiment with six in total). Although a relatively new problem in eco-
nomics, the unsupervised and automatic measurement of the intensity, or semantic orientation, of
text is commonplace and a long-standing issue in computational linguistics and statistical natural
language processing—scientiﬁc ﬁelds at the intersection between computer science and linguistics
(see the book by Manning and Sch¨ utze [1999] for a review).18 As such, there is a considerable
variety of alternative approaches aiming at quantitatively “evaluating” the meaning of language.
16See Romer and Romer [2004] and Bernanke, Reinhart, and Sack [2004] for applications of subjective measures
in the analysis of the Fed’s policy stance and communication using FOMC minutes/transcripts and statements,
respectively.
17The heuristic score reported is the consensus on the analysis of each statements by the three reviewers (including
the authors). We limit the number of scorers due to the inherent subjective nature of the score. This notwithstanding,
the relatively high concordance in assessing the orientation of statements across the diﬀerent scorers reveals that for
several phrases there seems to relatively little ambiguity of interpretation of rule (1).
18There are already few interesting applications of computational linguistics in the economic literature, however.
For an application of latent semantic analysis to FOMC minutes see Boukus and Rosenberg [2006]. Other examples
include Stock and Trebbi [2003], Antweiler and Frank [2004], Tetlock [2007], and Gentzkow and Shapiro [2006] and
Demers and Vega [2008]. Intuitive linguistics indices, such as word counts, have been occasionally the focus of research
in monetary economics, for example in Gorodnichenko and Shapiro [2007].
8We follow two diﬀerent methodologies to validate the analysis from diﬀerent perspectives. A ﬁrst
approach—the Google semantic orientation score—relies on estimating the systematic co-occurrence
of concepts retrieved from webpages, an idea initially proposed by Church and Hanks [1990], and
ﬁrst applied to the analysis of semantic orientation through information retrieval on the Internet
by Turney [2002]. As described below, the directness of the approach makes it relatively easy
to implement and transparent to interpret as compared to other methodologies proposed in the
computational linguistics literature.19 Our second approach—the Factiva semantic orientation
score—relies on analogous principles of information retrieval, but it is based on the discussion of
FOMC statements in news outlets. This approach has the main advantage of letting us directly
access the corpus of text used to calculate the semantic score (the whole universe of documents
in the Dow Jones Factiva database released right before and after a given FOMC announcement),
drastically increasing the precision in measurement.
We will start from a description of the ﬁrst measure. Due to space constraints, we present here
a general characterization of the scores and relegate the bulk of the implementation details to the
companion Appendix.20
2.1 The Google semantic orientation score
Assume that the metric that we wish to deﬁne can be properly characterized along a simple
antonymy, say for instance scoring a string of text x—either a word, a phrase, or a sentence—
on an “hawkish-dovish” scale. That is, we wish to create a score deﬁned over the real line whose
values depend on the hawkishness of the given string of text x as implied by a reference corpus of
text, in this case, the universe of webpages. We begin by deﬁning a measure of association between
concepts. If the meaning of x can be commonly interpreted as hawkish, then x and the word “hawk-
ish” should show a degree of positive statistical dependence in a suﬃciently large corpus of text. In
other words, the string x and the word “hawkish” should appear in a corpus of the text with a joint
frequency, Pr(x&hawkish), which is greater than if the two strings were statistically independent
concepts, in which case the joint frequency would be equal to the product of the marginals, or
Pr(x)Pr(hawkish). The Pointwise Mutual Information (PMI, Church and Hanks [1990]) between







PMI is a central concept in information theory, and it is derived from the joint entropy of two
random variables (see Manning and Sch¨ utze [1999] for a review). Speciﬁcally, given two elements,
PMI is a log-ratio indicating the amount of information that it is possible to gather about one
19For instance methods that require learning algorithms, such as the one employed by Hatzivassiloglou and McK-
eown [1997] in the study or semantic orientation of adjectives, or methods involving factor decompositions that are
diﬃcult to interpret, such as latent semantic analysis (Landauer and Dumais [1997], also see Boukus and Rosenberg
[2006] for an application to monetary policy). See Turney [2001] and Turney and Littman [2002] for a comparison
across the diﬀerent approaches.
20Available at: faculty.chicagobooth.edu/francesco.trebbi/research.html
9element of the message when the other message is observed.21 A measure of the relative degree
of association between the string x and the word “dovish” can be computed accordingly as in (2),
hence obtaining the degree of “dovishness” that we can attribute to x. In order to obtain a measure
of orientation we consider the relative PMI measure between the two polar concepts, and obtain a
theoretical score of semantic orientation (SO) of string x, based on (2), as:22
SO(x) = PMI(x,hawkish) − PMI(x,dovish).
The Internet represents a very large corpus of text from which it is possible to obtain empirical
frequencies of each string of text in a statement, and the words “hawkish” and “dovish”. Since
it is unfeasible to directly compute the joint frequencies of co-occurrence in the actual population
of webpages (at least without devoting huge computing resources), we empirically implement the
information retrieval (IR) process through hits counts on the search engine Google.23 The feasible
estimator of the semantic orientation score obtained by information retrieval on Google using the













where hits(q) is a function assigning the number of hits in the search of query q and ξ is a con-
stant that is independent of the speciﬁc string x being searched.24 The superscript “h” in GSO
h
denotes the antonymy “hawkish-dovish” used in building the score. The GSO
h score is deﬁned
over (−∞,∞) and is increasing in the degree of hawkishness of the string of text x. Computing
the scores associated with the strings X and X0, which we presented earlier in this Section, is
straightforward by implementing six searches in Google.25 For the hawkish sentence X we obtain
21As such, both computer scientists and linguists employ PMI as a measure of association between words, word
pairs and strings of text. In computing (2) we employ the base e instead of the base 2 as customary in the literature
(Turney [2002]). The base is immaterial, as the two measures are equivalent up to a constant.
22See Turney [2002] and Turney and Littman [2002].
23Available at: www.google.com. We make use of the University Research Program for Google Search for the
necessary high-volume sequential access. This search engine coverage can be thought as being virtually complete, and
its index of webpages is the largest available—it included 8,168,684,336 webpages in September 26, 2005 according to
the New York Times. Turney [2002] implements his searches on www.altavista.com, another popular search engine
because of the availability (at the time) of a NEAR operator to condition joint occurrences to be in a ten words radius
on searched webpages. This operator is no longer available on Altavista and it is also not available on Google. Each
search individually run on Google is rerouted to a speciﬁc data center depending on Internet traﬃc. Since each data
centers caches are slightly diﬀerent, we constrain our searches within the same data center by conditioning the search
on a common data center’s IP address. We experimented with several centers obtaining similar results. We also rerun
all our searches leaving the IP address unspeciﬁed. Although mildly more noisy, the results were also unaﬀected.
Finally we also ran searches on Altavista, which currently implements searches through the Yahoo! search engine,
obtaining similar results.
24Searches for units x containing more than one word are run as “phrase searches”, that is, they are enclosed in
quotation marks (see www.google.com/support/websearch/bin/answer.py?answer=136861).
25In the Appendix we detail the type of restrictions that should be applied in order to direct searches on identical
10the higher score GSO
h(X) = .98, and the lower score: GSO
h(X0) = −.53 for the relatively more
dovish sentence X0. This example is representative of how an unsupervised, automated algorithm
such as the SO-PMI can approximate a subjective interpretation of a string of text along the
hawkish–dovish dimension.26 Before further discussing the measurement of the FOMC statement
using the Google-based score, it is important to note that the antonymy “hawkish-dovish” (or oth-
ers that we consider below) is arguably used in contexts that are diﬀerent from discussing monetary
policy (such as documents related to international relations). Because the relative frequencies with
which the two words occur in the discussions of monetary policy could diﬀer from those in general
language use, the constant ξ is probably measured with error, adding a constant “level eﬀect” to
the measure. We directly abstract from this level by considering the measure:
GSOh(x) = GSO
h(x) − ξ, (4)
in what follows, therefore avoiding to interpret the level of the score. This does not restrict our
empirical analysis, however, which relies on using the score in ﬁrst diﬀerences that do not depend
on the constant terms.
We implement the scheme (4) on each sentence of an FOMC statement as follows. We ﬁrst apply a
Brill [1994] part-of-speech tagger to the text, which is a natural language processing algorithm used
to automatically classify and tag words in the lexical categories of nouns, adjectives, verbs, adverbs,
pronouns and coordinating conjunctions. After this pre-processing, we apply an automated routine
to obtain groups—chunks—of related words based on the lexical tags corresponding to either verbal,
noun or adjectival phrases. We ﬁnally run searches on sub-sentences obtained by joining ﬁve (or
less) of these chunks.27 To obtain the search units x, the algorithm moves on a rolling window for
sentences including more than ﬁve chunks, and uses the whole sentence otherwise. After obtaining
the scores for each search unit x, we average GSOh(x) over all x in the statement to obtain a score
for statement t.28
Because we cannot directly measure expectations for the content of the statement on the Internet, in
Google data centers and side-step automatic Internet traﬃc optimizers.
26The Internet evolves continuously over time. Pages are substituted and dropped from Google caches over time
and its index algorithm is run every day. This implies that searches executed at diﬀerent moments, even on the same
data center, may diﬀer. We run our searches in April 2007, August 2007, and May 2009 and found a correlation
across hits of above 80 percent, indicating a substantial, although not perfect, degree of persistence. One general
interpretation is that the strength of association between concepts is persistent and does not change as fast as the
Internet over time.
27We include only searches longer than three words, to exclude incidentals and sentences for which not clear
semantic orientation can be deﬁned. For instance running a query for the sub-sentence “in any event,” or “the
committee believes” would not be meaningful in our context. We experimented with three, four, ﬁve, and six chunks
and obtained the best ﬁt employing the four and ﬁve chunks. We report the analysis performed joining ﬁve chunks,
although the results in the following sections are robust to alternative sub-sentence lengths. Employing searches
directly on whole sentences, however, did report zero hits very frequently (hence a problem for the logs) and resulted
in large number missing observations and noisy measurement. The robustness results are available from the authors
upon request. The automated searches and natural language processing of the text is implemented in Python 2.5,
using routines from Liu [2004] and Bird and Loper [2006]. All details are in Appendix.
28With a slight abuse of notation we also indicate with the release date t the statement released on that date.
11the empirical analysis below, we approximate the unexpected change in the content of the statement
at date t as the diﬀerence between the semantic orientation score at meeting t and the score at





Of course, such an approximation will be true only when the score evolves according to a random
walk, while, otherwise, the approximation will imply a measurement error in the construction of
the shocks to the content of the statement.29 We return to these issues below in the paper.
For simplicity of exposition we have focused thus far on the antonymy “hawkish-dovish” to construct
the Google-based score. These two words are particularly pertinent for our analysis as they are
frequently used in the ﬁnancial press and by other market commentators when discussing U.S.
monetary policy. More generally, the SO-PMI measure can be extended to consider multiple sets
of antonyms simultaneously. As an alternative to the GSOh score, we consider a Google-based
score implementation using six pairs of words in total. In this implementation, words associated
with positive rate changes form the list P = {hawkish, tighten, hike, raise, increase, boost}, while
words associated with negative changes in policy rates movement form the list N = {dovish, ease,
cut, lower, decrease, loose}.30 We deﬁne the score GSOe, as the semantic orientation score based
on the extended set of P and N antonymies. The GSOe score adds the total number of joint hits
of x and each of the words predicting positive (respectively, negative) interest rates movement and
uses this sum in the numerator (respectively, denominator) of the argument of the logarithm in
(4). This deﬁnition can be justiﬁed in thinking of the words within each of the sets P and N, as
having the same meaning, that is, as being synonyms along our metric of semantic orientation.
By focusing on a set of synonyms, the GSOe score captures additional information as compared to
GSOh, thus increasing the coverage of the score, that is, the number of search hits per sentence,
and the fraction of sentences for which we can ﬁnd search hits in Google. However, by leveraging on
word pairs with as much pertinence to current policy actions as to future policy moves, more noise
is added to the measure.31 In particular, measurement error is a problem that compounds when
dealing with diﬀerences as in (5). Nonetheless, in levels the fully automated score GSOe appears
reasonable as a measure of communication, and leads the policy rate by about two quarters, as
reported in Figure 2, as accurately as, if not more than, the heuristic index. The correlation of the
GSOe score and the fourth Eurodollar futures implied rate is about 40 percent (Table 1).
29The ﬁrst order serial autocorrelation of the GSO
h score is about .7 in our sample.
30Google searches automatically include hits based on related matches such as “tight”, “increasing”, etc.
31The words hawkish and dovish are particularly pertinent to the analysis of central bank stance and forward
policy, since they are often used in the context of the FOMC’s near-future interest rates behavior. Words like hike
or cut instead often appear in the discussion of both current hikes/cuts of target rates and future hikes/cuts, making
more ambiguous their pertinence as a measure of forward policy.
122.2 The Factiva semantic orientation score
The Google semantic orientation score relies on the Internet as the corpus of text on which the joint
frequencies that form the score are estimated. Because we can only access the text of the corpus of
webpages indirectly through Google searches, we have a rather limited control over which speciﬁc
texts the search is run over, the speciﬁc time periods of reference, or the relevance of the matches
obtained from the search engine. In addition, Google does not publicly disclose the algorithm it
uses to calculate and approximate the count of hits of a given search. These restrictions can be
avoided by implementing a more standard IR protocol on a corpus of text for which we can directly
access the text underlying the corpus. This is the main advantage of the Factiva-based score that
we now present.
To construct this score we use discussions of FOMC announcements from newspaper, magazine,
newswires and newsletters that are included in the Dow Jones Factiva database, a leading provider
of business and ﬁnancial news.32 The original documents range from very short pieces of newswire
information to long newspaper articles and commentaries. To implement the score we search all
sources available worldwide in English, for articles with headlines involving the words “Federal
Reserve”, “Fed” of “FOMC”, around times of FOMC meetings and record all the sentences in
the database that match this criterion. We select all these articles on a 3-days window around
the FOMC meeting starting on the day before, and ending on the day after, the announcement.
This lets us focus on information as pertinent as possible to each given policy announcement.
All documents are then subdivided into sentences and assigned a unique identiﬁer. This set of
sentences constitutes the corpus of text, T, on which we run our text searches to form the Factiva-
based score.33 The total number of sentences in T is 1,302,977 or about 15,512 sentences per
statement. Let us indicate with Tt the set of sentences in news articles around release date t and
hence pertaining to statement t.
Although this corpus of text is relatively large, it is by many orders of magnitude smaller than
the Google’s search cache. Thus, rather than trying to ﬁnd direct matches of strings of text from
each statement, we directly measure the semantic orientation of sentences referring to the state-
ment or interest rate decisions as a proxy for the stance of policy. Let us deﬁne as relevant for
the FOMC meeting discussion a sentence s if it contains any word in the list R = {Rates, Pol-
icy, Policies, Statement, Announcement, Fed, FOMC, Federal Reserve}.34 Deﬁne as I[s, W, W0]
an indicator function that takes value 1 if sentence s contains at least a word from list W and at
least a word from list W0, and 0 otherwise. 35 We compute the Factiva semantic orientation score
32Factiva includes a collection of more than 25,000 news sources including The Wall Street Journal, the Financial
Times, Dow Jones Reuters, and the Associated Press.
33We implement the search using “regular expressions” in Python.
34About 40 percent of all sentences in the corpus are relevant according to this criterion.
35An example of I[s, R, P] = 1 match is the sentence “FED WATCH: Economists Expect At Least One More Rate
Hike”, the title of a Dow Jones Capital Markets wire on January 31, 2006.














where P indicates the set of words associated with positive target rates movement (respectively, N
for negative). Equation (6) is the log-ratio of the frequencies of relevant sentences suggesting policy
rate increases as opposed to relevant sentences suggesting rate decreases. The role of (6) mirrors
the type of co-occurrence that (4) estimates through Google hit counts. We calculate the score
FSOe using the list of antonymies that deﬁned the score GSOe when also including as matches
in (6) strictly equivalent words in the sets P and N.36 In a similar fashion to the Google-based
GSOh score, we also consider a Factiva “hawkish-dovish” index, FSOh, by collapsing the P list to
the word “hawkish” only, and to the word “dovish” for N.
Let us further indicate with Tt− ⊂ Tt the set of sentences in the Factiva corpus in the 3-days
window that precede the FOMC announcement and with Tt+ ⊂ Tt the set of sentences in news
articles released after the announcement. We compute unexpected changes in the stance of the
FOMC announcement at t as the diﬀerence between the Factiva semantic orientation score based
on news released before and after the announcement:
∆FSOt = FSOt+ − FSOt−. (7)
Note that the calculation of the diﬀerence (7) reﬂects the high degree of precision obtained by
directly accessing the underlying text to determine the exact time of the information included
in constructing (6). Such precision is unfeasible for the Google-based score (at least under the
current state of the search technology), but easy to achieve in Factiva. For the expanded set of
antonymies, it is important to notice here that both (6) and (7) are likely to capture discussion
concerning not just policy communication, but the policy action taken at the meeting. Fortunately,
having full control over the text search, alleviates in part this problem (in addition to controlling
for the immediate policy action in the empirical speciﬁcations). In particular, we compute FSOt+
by removing all instances of matches in the past tense for verbs, thus avoiding discussions of the
most recent or past policy action (at t) and thus focusing on future policy moves (and similarly for
FSOt− although only discussions of past, rather than the immediately forthcoming action at t, can
be excluded this way). We ﬁnally reﬁne our measures by excluding from the set of joint matches
direct negations of the words included in the list of antonymies (for example, “not hawkish”) and
include direct negations of the opposite (for example, “not dovish” for “hawkish”). Notice that such
a degree of precision cannot be achieved within Google, where conditions of relevance or vicinity
of negations cannot be reliably imposed within the search protocol.
As reported in Figure 3, the Factiva automated score FSOe constructed with this algorithm leads
36For example “rates” is considered an equivalent to the word “rate”. We achieve this by matching the roots of
the words in each set, rather the exact words, using regular expressions in the search code.
14the policy rate by more than two quarters, with movements in levels that track the rate implied
by the fourth Eurodollar futures contract fairly accurately (a correlation of about 40 percent).
The Google- and Factiva based scores deﬁned on the extended set of antonymies also display a
correlation of over 80 percent (Table 1). We describe the empirical properties of the Factiva- and
Google-based scores in more detail in the rest of the paper, after discussing next the data used in
the analysis.
3 Data
This Section describes the data used in the empirical analysis. The sample includes 82 FOMC
statements starting in May 1999 and ending in December 2008.37 The starting point marks the date
in which the FOMC begun releasing statements after all meetings, irrespective of whether a change
in the target federal funds rate was announced at that meeting or not. For each full calendar year
in our sample, the FOMC released 8 statements following so-called “scheduled” policy meetings.
Although the dates of scheduled meetings can shift by up to a couple of weeks from year to year, the
precise schedule of these meetings is set (and communicated to the public) with about 6 months
lead. Scheduled meetings are not equally spaced on calendar years, but have occurred almost
every 1-1/2 months in our sample. In 2001, 2007 and 2008, the FOMC also released statements
following unscheduled meetings. These statements were associated with either intermeeting policy
rate changes–always cuts in our sample—or, after the onset of the ﬁnancial turmoil in August 2007,
with other policy actions aimed at relieving pressures in ﬁnancial markets.38 Because this paper
focuses on communication about monetary policy rates, we only include statements for unscheduled
policy meetings that discuss current or future policy rate decisions. These statements have always
coincided with meetings at which changes in the current target federal funds or discount rate were
announced. In addition, due to missing ﬁnancial quotes after the September 11 terrorist attacks,
the September 17, 2001 statement is not included in our regressions.
Interest rate response regressions In the next Section, we study interest rate responses on
narrow temporal windows around FOMC announcements to interest rate decisions and communi-
cation. In this analysis we use high-frequency intra-day data to better isolate the impact of policy
actions from other same-day events, such as economic data releases. We consider interest rate
responses on time windows that are 30 minutes long, starting 10 minutes before and ending 20
minutes after the announcements. The dependent variables are basis point yield changes of on-the-
run (benchmark) Treasury securities, including bills with maturities of 3- and 6-months, as well as
2-, 5-, 10-, and 30-years coupon-bearing Treasuries. In addition, we also consider implied rates on
short and medium-dated Eurodollar futures contracts. These contracts are cash settled on realized
37The statements are available on the website of the Federal Reserve Board:
www.federalreserve.gov/monetarypolicy/fomc.htm.
38For example on August 10, 2007, the FOMC statement noted that the Federal Reserve was providing liquidity
to facilitate the functioning of short-term interbank funding market. Several of the new lending facilities aimed at
addressing pressures in short-term funding markets were announced in 2008 using FOMC statements.
15Libor rates at settlement dates.39 Our explanatory variables include changes in policy rates and
announcements. Following Kuttner [2001], the regressions include the unexpected component of
policy rate decisions—hereafter, referred to as the monetary policy surprise—as measured by the
change in the current-month federal funds futures contract, rescaled to account for the date of the
meeting within each month.40 As discussed in Section 2, for Google-based scores we construct a
measure of unexpected shock to the content of the policy statements as the change in the current
semantic score relative to the score of previous FOMC meeting. For the scores constructed on
Factiva data, instead, the shocks are measured as diﬀerences between the content of news articles
released approximately in the 36 hours after relative to those released in the 36 hours prior each
FOMC announcements.41
Table 2 reports summary measures for the dependent and independent variables included in the
regressions. As seen in the upper-panel of the Table, the standard deviation of Treasury yield
changes range between about 5 and 6-1/2 basis points depending on the maturity of the Trea-
sury security; the 2-year security is the security that displays the largest volatility. Changes in
Eurodollar futures implied rates are slightly more volatile than Treasury yields (middle panel of
Table 2), and are highly correlated with changes in Treasury yields of comparable maturities (not
reported in the Tables). With a few exceptions, interest changes around announcements are fairly
small in magnitude, pointing to the fact that yields already incorporate much of the actions and
communication ahead of the actual announcements. The largest yield declines shown in the Table
occurred following the 50 basis point intermeeting cut on April 18, 2001. The largest increase,
instead, occurred following the January 28, 2004 meeting, reportedly due to the omission of the
phrase “policy accommodation can be maintained for a considerable period” in the FOMC state-
ment, which, according to market reports, was interpreted by investors as a signal that a policy
tightening cycle could begin in the near future. The lower-panel of Table 2 and Table 3 present
summary measures and pairwise correlations for the monetary policy surprise and semantic scores
based on the hawkish/dovish and the extended set of antonymies discussed in the previous Section
on information from Google and from Factiva (respectively, GSOh, GSOe, FSOh and FSOe). As
39 The source of intra-day data is the internal database of the Federal Reserve Board. On-the-run Treasury
securities are, for each maturity, the ones being most recently auctioned by the U.S. Treasury. These securities
are more actively traded in the secondary market than their oﬀ-the-run counterparts. Eurodollar futures contracts
are obligations for the seller to deliver ﬁxed amounts of Eurodollar 3-months deposits at expiration (the contract
is quoted as p=100-r, where r = 3-month Libor; all results in the paper refer to the implicit yield, r, rather than
to the price,p). At each moment in time, price quotes are available for quarterly contracts expiring in mid-March,
June, September and December for the following ten years (for each month, the delivery date is the second London
bank business day before the third Wednesday of the month). For example, in August 2007, the second contract is
December 2007, while the eighth contract is the June 2009. The liquidity of contracts expiring far in the future is
fairly limited and so we only include the ﬁrst eight contracts in our analysis.
40Federal funds futures contracts are priced on the the average eﬀective federal funds rate for the month of expi-
ration. The monetary policy surprise is calculated as: (FFt+ −FFt−)·dm/(dm−d), where FFt+ and FFt− are the
futures federal funds rate after and before the FOMC announcement, respectively. The scaling factor, dm/(dm−d),
adjusts for the averaging eﬀect of the federal funds futures rates (dm denotes the total number of days in the month,
and d is the day of the month in which the meeting takes place). See Kuttner [2001] for more details.
41For unscheduled meetings, the diﬀerence is Factiva scores refers to the prior meeting score as it is the case for
Google scores in general.
16shown in Table 2, the FSOh score is only deﬁned for about two-thirds of the observations included
in the sample. With the exception of the GSOe, changes in all semantic scores are uncorrelated
with monetary policy surprises, highlighting how these measures are likely capturing information,
which is unrelated to current policy actions. As discussed in Section 2, the GSOe score is likely
measured with error as its level is likely inﬂuenced and partially reﬂects contemporaneous rate de-
cisions taken at the meeting. This is due to the diﬃculty in matching with precision the extended
set of antonymies through Google searches.
For an easier interpretation of the coeﬃcients in Section 4 we standardize changes in all semantic
scores—imposing a zero mean and unit standard deviation—so that the units of the coeﬃcients are
expressed as basis point changes of each dependent variable per unit standard deviation increase
in the scores.
Univariate interest rate forecasting regressions These forecasting regressions assess the
predictive content of changes in the semantic scores around FOMC announcements for future
realized short-term interest rates. The regressions include as controls, the monetary policy surprise
as deﬁned above, the slope of the Treasury yield curve measured as the diﬀerence between yields
of 10- and 2-year Treasuries using quotes 10 minutes ahead of the FOMC announcements, a credit
spread between 10-year BBB-rated corporate bonds and Treasury yields at the close of the previous
business day, a dummy for NBER dated recessions.42 The regressions also include futures rates as
of 10 minutes before the announcement implied by the ﬁrst 8 quarterly Eurodollar and the ﬁrst 6
federal funds futures. The dependent variables in the regressions are chosen to match the settlement
rates of the futures contracts included in the regressions: Monthly averages of the federal funds rate
for the “federal funds rate” regressions and the Libor rate on settlement dates for the “Eurodollar
futures” regressions.
Taylor rule analysis In this analysis we mainly follow the forward looking Taylor rule imple-
mentation of Orphanides [2001, 2003] and use mid-quarter Greenbook forecasts of the output gap
and output deﬂator, prepared by the staﬀ of the Federal Reserve Board on the week preceding each
scheduled policy meeting. These data are released to the public with a 5-year lag, and are available
on the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. We supplement the last 5-year of
missing data with real-time measures of output potential from the Congressional Budget Oﬃce
and forecasts of GDP and of the GDP deﬂator from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
The SPF data are also available on the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The
federal funds rate and semantic scores included in the analysis are average quarterly levels.
VAR analysis The VAR is estimated at monthly frequency using macroeconomic data as of June
2009. The speciﬁcation includes monthly averages of the semantic scores and federal funds rate,
as well as annualized quarterly log-changes in nonfarm payroll employment and in the core PCE
42We do not have intra-day estimates of constant-maturity corporate yields.
17deﬂator. Finally the VAR includes monthly averages of par-yields on constant maturity Treasury
yields. These yields are estimated from a Svensson-Nelson-Siegel yield curve by Gurkaynak, Sack,
and Wright [2007] using oﬀ-the-run Treasuries, and the data are available on the website of the
Federal Reserve Board.
4 High-frequency interest rate response regressions
In this Section we study the high-frequency response of Treasury (Table 4) and Eurodollar futures
(Table 5) rates to changes in the content of FOMC statements, as measured by the linguistic scores.
We start by describing the empirical speciﬁcation and then turn to the estimation results.
Empirical speciﬁcation We use a high-frequency identiﬁcation approach to isolate the eﬀects
on interest rates of monetary policy actions and communication from other same-day news or
events.43 The model speciﬁcations for the Treasury and Eurodollar regressions are analogous, and
we only discuss the Treasury one in detail. Let ∆yi
t be the yield change for an on-the-run security
with maturity i = 1,...,m during the tight time window around the FOMC announcement at date
t. Under rational expectations, interest rates should only respond to the unanticipated component
of target rate decisions and communication during this temporal window. Let MPt denote the
monetary policy surprise. As discussed in Section 3, MPt is the component of the target rate
decision, which is unexpected by market participants as implied by futures quotes.
For the sake of comparison, we separately consider alternative measures of changes in communica-
tion, including the change in the human-generated heuristic score, ∆HI, and changes in the four
automated measures of semantic orientation either deﬁned on the “hawkish-dovish” antonymy on
Google and Factiva, ∆GSOh and ∆FSOh, or deﬁned on the larger set of antonymies on the two
data sources—∆GSOe and ∆FSOe. Changes in Factiva scores are based on measures recorder
after and before a given announcement on time windows of about 1-1/2 days (equation 7). These
changes should therefore measure the unexpected change in the content of the announcements
along our metric. Changes in the Google and heuristic scores at t are, instead, expressed as dif-
ferences between the scores at t and t − 1; see equation 5. These scores are therefore more likely
capturing both anticipated and unanticipated components of communication, likely adding some
measurement error in the regressions. Under reasonable expectation assumptions, this form of
measurement error should bias the estimated coeﬃcients toward zero.
Our empirical setup is designed to allow for cross-equation restrictions, and tests on the vector of
the coeﬃcients βi’s measuring interest-rate sensitivities to the linguistic scores and monetary policy
surprise.44 Deﬁne ∆Xt = [1 MPt ∆Scoret]. The speciﬁcation expressed in stacked form can then
43The validity of this approach is discussed in Cochrane and Piazzesi [2002] for daily data and in Fleming and
Piazzesi [2005] intra-day.
44For related work in the literature, see Kuttner [2001], Fleming and Piazzesi [2005], and G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and
Swanson [2005], among others.


















































































which can be interpreted as a system of m seemingly unrelated equations. It is important to note
that, due to diﬀerences in the coverage of FOMC announcements on news and the Internet, not
all observations in (8) are measured with the same degree of precision leading to heteroskedasticity
in the error term. We can easily account for such variation in measurement precision both for the
Google- and Factiva-based regressions. In speciﬁcations employing the Google scores we weigh the
observations in (8) by the median number of Google hits across all searches pertinent to statement
t. 45 In speciﬁcations employing Factiva scores we weigh by the total number of sentences in news
article relevant for the statement t. 46
Treasury yields Table 4 reports regression results for Treasury yields. The ﬁrst column of the
Table reports estimates for a benchmark regression only containing the monetary policy surprise
MP, while the remaining columns report parameter estimates of models that include the diﬀerent
linguistic scores. The model speciﬁcation in (8) for Treasury yields is a system of 6 equations having
as left-hand-side variable, yields on 3- and 6-month bills as well as those on 2-, 5-, 10-, 30-year
coupon bearing Treasuries. The horizontal panels in the Table, report model estimates across yields.
First consider the benchmark speciﬁcation, which only includes a constant and the monetary policy
surprise MP (ﬁrst column of Table 4) and is identical, up to sample coverage, to those considered
in earlier literature.47 Similarly to previous ﬁndings, we ﬁnd evidence of a statistically signiﬁcant
eﬀect of MP only on short-term yields with a substantial drop in the fraction of the variance
explained for longer-dated yields.48
45Across all search units and all sentences. Google weights are constructed from marginal frequencies of search
units (i.e. hits(x) using Section 2 notation).
46Unweighted results present a loss in precision that occasionally reduces signiﬁcance below standard conﬁdence
levels, but do not aﬀect the qualitative results in high or low frequency. Results available from the authors upon
request. We also allow for a general within-announcement (t) covariance structure for the error terms across the m














































This variance-covariance matrix allows us to obtain standard errors that are robust for general time-varying and
within-meeting correlation across error terms.
47See Table 1 of Fleming and Piazzesi [2005] and of G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson [2005].
48The point estimates imply that a 1 standard deviation increase in the monetary policy surprise (about 10 basis
points, Table 2) implies positive and signiﬁcant increases of about 3.5 basis points on yields of 3- and 6-month bills,
19The remaining columns of Table 4 report regression results of models that include the diﬀerent
linguistic scores. In each of these models, the coeﬃcient on ∆Score measures the interest rate
response in basis points of a unit standard deviation increase in each score (all ∆Scores are stan-
dardized to have a zero mean and a unit standard deviation). Column 2 reports regression results
for the heuristic score, HI, deﬁned in (1). As shown in the Table the change in the HI score
does not appear to contain explanatory power for Treasury yields on the full sample. Much of
the explanatory power is lost starting in mid-2007, likely owing to the rigidity of the rule (1) in
adapting to changes in the structure of the FOMC statement in the most recent period.49
The semantic orientation score included in the regression speciﬁcation in column 3, GSOh, is based
on the “hawkish-dovish” antonymy using data from Google. According to the parameter estimates,
a unit standard deviation increase in the score leads to a hump-shaped response of the Treasury
curve around the FOMC announcement. Yield responses to ∆GSOh are about zero for maturities
under a year, peak in the 2- to 5- year sectors of the curve at about two basis points per standard
deviation, and are not statistically diﬀerent from zero for the 30-year bond. The responses are
signiﬁcant at conventional statistical levels in the 2- to 10-year sectors, and are non negligible in
magnitude relative to the variation in the dependent variables (Changes in Treasury yields range
between 4.5 and 6.5 basis points over the sample, Table 2).50 As we will discuss in Section 5,
yield response are signiﬁcantly larger after the initial response and reach their maxima more than
a year after the initial shock in the scores. The introduction of the semantic scores increases the
explanatory power of the regression at medium- and long-term maturities relative to the benchmark
regression with an increase in R2 of about 10 percentage points.51 As shown at the bottom panel of
Table 4, the p-values for the Wald test of equality between the 3-month and 2-year score-coeﬃcients,
and of about 2.5 basis points in the 2-year yield. Note the non-monotonicity in the R
2 reported for the 30−year
yield, which presents a higher R
2 than the 2- and 5− year yields. The MPt coeﬃcient also has the wrong sign for
this maturity. This is mostly owes to the inclusion in the sample of the unscheduled meetings of January 3, April 4,
and September 17, 2001. The results in terms of the linguistic scores below are robust to the exclusion of these three
observations.
49More in detail, when estimating the same regression using data through August 2007, we found some predictive
power of the HI score in the 6-month to 5-year sector of the Treasury curve. With the onset of the ﬁnancial turmoil
in August 2007 the statistical and economic signiﬁcance of the HI score has declined signiﬁcantly, likely owing in
part to the notable changes in the structure of the statements—for example, in terms of the number of sentences
included in the statement—as compared with those released prior to August 2007. The simple rule deﬁned in (1) to
construct the HI score, and particularly its deﬁnition at the sentence level, appears rigid in capturing the changing
structure of the statement over the entire sample. As we discuss next, the automated semantic orientation scores,
instead, appear to adapt more easily to the changing structure of the statement.
50We also performed our analysis with the on-the-run 5-year and 10-year Treasury Inﬂation Protected Securities
(TIPS) and the corresponding inﬂation break-evens. We found positive eﬀects of the statement stance on the real rates,
but the estimates were relatively imprecise. The eﬀects on inﬂation compensation was statistically and economically
close to zero. Due to the relative illiquidity of TIPS relative to their nominal counterparts, high-frequency movements
in breakevens are probably not very representative of underlying changes in inﬂation expectations.
51Other papers have also shown how FOMC statements and minutes correlate with long-term yields’ reactions.
Among others this result is conﬁrmed in G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson [2005] and Boukus and Rosenberg [2006].
The advantage of our approach is that our scores allow us to precisely identify and quantify the dimension along
which the announcement matters. This intuition is lost when employing factor analysis or latent semantic analysis,
since the latent factors lack a clear interpretation. Nonetheless such papers deserve credit for pointing at the potential
role of FOMC announcements.
20as well as between the 3-month and 2-year score-coeﬃcients, both reject statistically conﬁrming
the hump-shapedness of the response across maturities. Column 5 reports regression results for
the semantic score deﬁned on the “hawkish-dovish” antonymy on Factiva, FSOh. As shown at
the bottom of the Table only 58 observations are included in the estimation, owing to a lack of
matches in the Factiva corpus in the sample up to the end of 2003. Although the point estimates
are slightly smaller than those obtained using the GSOh, the results are very similar.
We now turn to parameter estimates for the scores deﬁned on the expanded set of antonymies.
Column 4 of Table 4 reports the results for the Google score on the enlarged set of antonymies,
GSOe. Likely, due to the signiﬁcant error in measuring this score in Google, as discussed above,
the coeﬃcients on the scores across maturities are all statistically insigniﬁcant (and also enter
with a wrong sign). The last column of the Table reports estimates using the Factiva score based
on the large set of antonymies, FSOe. This measure is more precisely estimated than its Google
counterpart as we can calculate the empirical frequencies directly on the texts that form the Factiva
corpus. Furthermore, we can distinguish the pertinence of the sentences underlying the measure
to future, rather than current, policy moves. As for the scores based on the “hawkish-dovish”
antonymy, yield responses are hump-shaped across maturities, although the peak of the response is
somewhat more pronounced in the 2-year sector for the FSOe score.52,53 In sum, with the exclusion
of model that includes the Google score based on the expanded set of antonymies, we ﬁnd that
while target rate decisions mainly aﬀect the short-end of the Treasury curve, policy communication
have their largest eﬀects on medium-term yields.
Eurodollar futures rates We now turn to a discussion of the response of rates implied by
short- medium-dated Eurodollar futures. As discussed in Section 3, these futures, which are among
the world’s most liquid ﬁnancial derivatives, settle on realized 3-month Libor rates at speciﬁed
dates. By studying the response of interest rate futures, we attempt to more precisely characterize
yield responses across maturities in an analysis of forward-, rather than spot-, rates in the dollar
denominated “risk-free” yield curve.54 In our analysis, we concentrate on the ﬁrst 8 quarterly
52According to the point estimates, a one standard deviation increase in the FSO
e score, implies an increase in
the 2-year yield of about 2.5 basis points, of about 1 basis points for the 6-month bill, and of about 1.5 basis points
for the 5-year note. Yield responses at shorter or longer maturities are smaller in magnitude and not statistically
signiﬁcant at conventional levels. The p-values for the Wald tests of equality between the 2- and 30-year coeﬃcients,
and between the 3-month and 2-year yields reject the nulls, statistically conﬁrming the presence of a hump in the
response of yields across maturities.
53It is interesting to note that the size of the coeﬃcients on the monetary policy surprise, MP, remain considerably
stable across speciﬁcations conﬁrming the quantitative estimates in column (1). This result likely owes to the relatively
low correlation between changes in the semantic scores and the MP, as reported in Table 3.
54Although the diﬀerence, or basis, between Libor and Treasury rates of comparable maturities (also known as the
TED spread) were rather stable for most of the sample, the spread between the two rates widened considerably with
the start of the ﬁnancial turmoil in August 2007. The spreads between the two rates has also risen on relatively rare
events before 2007, for example ahead of year end in 1999 (Y2K) and at other year ends. For additional discussion
about the use of Libor versus federal funds rates in computing market based monetary policy expectations, see
G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson [2007]. Due to the volatility in this spread, Eurodollar rates likely measured with
error “risk-free” rates, implying noisier estimates in our regression. Nonetheless, we focus on Eurodollar futures
implied rates due their very high liquidity and our focus on high-frequency responses. In addition, previous literature
21contracts, which are the most liquid, therefore covering the 3-month to 2-year sectors of the curve,
and for brevity we omit regression results for the third, ﬁfth and seventh contracts in the Tables.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 presents results for the benchmark which excludes the linguistic mea-
sures. Although the coeﬃcient on MP is positive at all maturities, the size of the coeﬃcients
decline for longer-dated contracts, conﬁrming the Treasury-yield ﬁndings. Columns 2 through 6
report regression results when including the linguistic measures. As for the case of Treasury yield
regressions, we ﬁnd interest rate responses to the HI and the GSOe scores not to be statistically
diﬀerent from zero across all maturities. Turning to the scores deﬁned on the “hawkish-dovish”
antonymy, the responses to the GSOh score are increasing under the one year maturity, and about
ﬂat for contracts between the fourth and the eighth, or about 1 to 2 years out, with a coeﬃcient of
about 3 basis point per standard deviation. The responses to the FSOh score, which is only deﬁned
for 58 observation, are broadly similar, although the point estimates imply responses about 1 basis
points smaller and somewhat lower responses at longer maturities. Similarly, the coeﬃcients on the
FSOe score imply a peak response of about 2 basis points for the fourth contract and somewhat
smaller responses further out. At the bottom of Table 5, the Wald tests for equality between the
coeﬃcient on the ﬁrst and the eighth futures rate can never reject the null for speciﬁcations that
include the automated scores.
In sum, although the point estimates are not suﬃciently precisely estimated to tightly pin down
the peak response of futures rates to FOMC announcements the estimates point to a peak about
1 to 1-1/2 years out. This ﬁnding provides some support for the use of Eurodollar implied futures
rates at these maturities as proxies of central bank communication in earlier literature, such as
G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson [2005]. Nonetheless, although the inclusion of the semantic scores
leads to a signiﬁcant increment in the fraction of the variance especially at the one- and two-year
maturities, the R2 of the regression range at about 25 percent at the one-year maturity. This
points to some diﬀerence in the information captured by variations in the automated scores from
those which would be indirectly inferred in using futures rates at these maturities as proxies for
changes in communication. We return to this topic in the discussion of the univariate interest rate
forecasting regressions in the next Section and in the conclusions.
5 Low-frequency results
This Section studies the link between central bank communication and target rate decisions with
measures of inﬂation, economic activity and nominal risk-free rates. We study these relations
using three empirical models: (i) a univariate model to predict short-term interest rates using the
semantic scores, (ii) a univariate Taylor [1993]-type forward looking speciﬁcation for the federal
funds rate, and (iii) a vector autoregression (VAR) speciﬁcation.
attempting to measure the eﬀects of central bank communication has used Eurodollar futures rates at about 1-year
maturities as indirect measures of central bank communication
22For brevity in this Section we only discuss results for the FSOe score, which is deﬁned on the
expanded set of antonymies using data from Factiva. Overall, we ﬁnd that this measures performs
best in low frequency, especially in diﬀerences, as compared with the GSOe score, deﬁned on
Google, and the scores based on the hawkish/dovish antonymy. As previously discussed, because
we cannot directly access the text of the webpages, the GSOe score is likely aﬀected by signiﬁcant
measurement error. In addition, the “hawkish-dovish” scores are also estimated imprecisely until
2003 due to a very limited number of matches on the “hawkish-dovish” antonymy, allowing an
analysis on a very limited sample size. For example, the GSOh measure is based on an average
of only about 5 hits for either word in the “hawkish-dovish” antonymy through the end of 2003
compared with about 300 hits on average afterwards.55 Similarly, due to a lack of hits on the word-
pair “hawkish-dovish” in the Factiva corpus, the FSOh is missing for about half the observations
prior to 2003.56
5.1 Forecasting short-term interest rates
Empirical speciﬁcation We study the in-sample predictive power for future realized short-term
interest rates of the semantic orientation scores. In particular, we assess whether more (less)
hawkish FOMC statements—as measured by the semantic scores—predict (in a Granger sense)
higher (lower) short-term rates, as postulated in previous Sections.
The model speciﬁcation that we consider controls for the unexpected component of the target rate
decision, as measured by the monetary surprise, MP, and the information available to market
participants ahead of the FOMC announcement as implied by fed funds futures quotes taken 15-
minutes before the FOMC announcements. We estimate model speciﬁcations at diﬀerent forecast
horizons that correspond to the contract characteristics of the federal funds futures included in
the model. In addition, because the liquidity of these futures declines sharply for expiration dates
beyond the ﬁrst few months, we also consider Eurodollar futures on longer horizons.57 The model
speciﬁcation is a modiﬁed Mincer-Zarnowitz regression:
(˜ rt+τn − rt−) = βn
0 + βn
1(fτn
t− − rt−) + βn
2MPt + βn
3∆FSOe
t + γXt− + n
t , (9)
where t denotes the time of an FOMC meeting. Speciﬁcations at each diﬀerent forecasting horizons
τn include futures implied rates ahead of the FOMC announcements, fτn
t−, and the rate, ˜ rt+τn, upon
which each futures contract settles as a left-hand side. For regressions that include the nth fed
funds futures rate, ˜ rt+τn is the average federal funds rate on the n − 1 calendar month following
55More precisely, using the notation in () these hits refer to the average across statements of the median
hits(dovish) + hits(hawkish) within all search units x in each statement.
56In a previous draft of the paper we imputed missing observations in the earlier part of the sample using one-step
ahead forecasts from an AR(1) model with the HI score as an exogenous variable using a Kalman ﬁlter. In this draft
we do not rely on such procedure.
57For example, the average notional open interest on fed funds futures in 2008:Q4 was about $45bn compared to
a notional interest of about $850bn for the fourth (quarterly) Eurodollar futures contract. The open interest for fed
funds futures in the earlier part of our sample was even smaller.
23the day of the FOMC meeting t. We consider regressions including the second to sixth fed funds
futures, corresponding to forecast horizons of up to 5-months. In the case of the nth Eurodollar
futures contracts the interest rate ˜ rt+τn is the 3-month Libor rate on the settlement date, which
occurs in the middle of the settlement month. Because we consider the ﬁrst eight contracts in the
quarterly cycle, the settlement dates fall in the months of March, June, September, and December
in either the current or the calendar year following the FOMC statement. The forecasting horizon
of the regressions including Eurodollar futures rates therefore range, on average, between 1-1/2
months out (ﬁrst Eurodollar contract) and 1 year and 11-1/2 months out (eighth contract). For
consistency we maintain the weighting procedure described in Section 4 when estimating ().58
As it is well known in the literature, the yields included in our regression are highly persistent
variables. In order to reduce such persistence, we follow work testing the expectation hypothesis
of the term structure of interest rates (Fama and Bliss [1987] and Campbell and Shiller [1991]
among others), by subtracting the current level of the intended fed funds rate and Libor rates,
respectively, from the realized rates, ˜ rt+τn and the futures rate fτn
t− in the fed funds and Eurodollar
futures regressions. The dependent variable in (58) is therefore the diﬀerence between realized spot
and current rates, whereas the independent variable is the futures-spot spread.59
Under forecasting eﬃciency of futures implied rates only the new information contained in the
FOMC statement, or the target rate decision, can have additional predictive power for realized
rates around the FOMC announcement. We capture the unexpected component of the target rate
decision using MP, and the new information in the statement using the change in the FSOe score,
which, as deﬁned in (7), uses information from the Factiva-corpus right before and after the release
of the FOMC announcement. The change in the semantic score, are standardized to a have a unit
standard deviation, and the yield variables included in the regressions are expressed in basis points.
The coeﬃcient βn
3 therefore measures the basis point response in the realized short-term rates to
a unit standard deviation unexpected increase in the hawkishness of the FOMC announcement as
implied by the reference text in Factiva.
It is important to note, however, that although we cannot reject the null of forecasting eﬃciency of
futures rates in a regression that only includes the futures-spot spread and a constant (that is, we
cannot reject the joint condition βn
1 = 1 and βn
0 = 0), consistent with the ﬁndings of G¨ urkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson [2007], work of Piazzesi and Swanson [2008] ﬁnd excess returns on fed funds
and Eurodollar futures to have been strongly countercyclical between 1988 and 2003, a ﬁnding
that they attribute to the presence of time-varying risk premia in market prices. Following their
work we also consider a regression speciﬁcation that includes the additional set of controls, Xt−,
58In using these weights, we place more emphasis on observations that are more precisely measured. Refer to
Section 4 for detail on the weighting scheme. We ﬁnd a limited impact of these weights on either point estimates or
standard errors of ().
59Futures rates are equal to forward rates up to some convexity adjustments because of marking-to-market on
exchanges of these contracts. These convexity adjustments are very small at the maturities that we consider, and we
therefore treat futures implied rates as forward rates in what follows (Burghardt [2003]).
24measured ahead of the FOMC announcement, which attempt to proxy for the time variation in term
premia in the futures rates. The set of controls includes the 10- to 2-year slope of the Treasury
yield curve, the credit spread between 10-year BBB-rated corporate bonds and Treasuries, and
a dummy variable for NBER-dated recessions.60 Finally, because of the overlapping forecasting
horizons in (58) and the corresponding moving average component in the error term, as well as
the varying forecasting horizon due to the uneven distribution of FOMC dates over the course
of the calendar year, we compute Newey and West [1987] heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
consistent covariance matrices with truncation lags equal to 1-1/2 times the forecasting horizon,
τn. We follow Cochrane and Piazzesi [2005] in setting a longer truncation lag than the number of
overlapping observations to counteract the under-weighting of distant covariance terms implied by
the Newey-West kernel weighting function. Finally, although the Newey-West adjustment accounts
for the time-series properties of the error term, it is important to point out that the elements of the
variance covariance matrices at the longest forecasting horizons are likely imprecisely estimated,
due to the signiﬁcant length of the truncation lags relative to the estimation sample. For the
same reason, the point estimates at distant horizons are probably estimated with less precision
than implied by the Newey West correction. Bearing these caveats in mind, we turn next to the
regression results.
Estimation results The parameter estimates of the forecasting model for the federal funds and
3-month Libor rates are reported in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. The upper-panel of Table 6
reports estimates for the federal funds rate models. The diﬀerent columns in the Table correspond
to speciﬁcations including the second to sixth fed funds futures rate, corresponding to a forecast
horizon of 1- to 5-months. As it can be seen from the diﬀerent columns, the sensitivity of future
rates to unit standard deviation increase in the FSOe build up monotonically with the forecast
horizon, ranging from about 5 basis points 1-month out, to about 25 basis points at the 5-month
horizon.61 The bottom-panel of Table 6 repeats the same regression exercise when controlling for
time varying risk-premia using an NBER recession dummy, the slope of the Treasury curve and a
credit spread. The regression coeﬃcients on ∆FSOe decline slightly and range between 3 and 20
basis points per standard deviation in ∆FSOe in these speciﬁcations.
The regression results for the Libor rate forecasting model that exclude the term-premium controls
are shown in the upper-panel of Table 7. The columns report results for the models including the
ﬁrst to eighth Eurodollar futures rate, corresponding to 3-month realized Libor starting about 1-1/2
to about 2 years out. As for the federal funds rate forecasting regression the coeﬃcients on ∆FSOe
are monotonically increasing in magnitude and range between 4 and 70 basis points per standard
60We have also included the real-time 12-month change in nonfarm payroll employment used in Piazzesi and
Swanson [2008], but found little predictive power of this variable in our shorter sample.
61In terms of the other controls included in the regression, the unexpected target decision MP contains predictive
power for realized rates only at very short horizons. Although the regression coeﬃcient on the futures-spot spread,
(f
τn
t− − rt−), is somewhat larger than one, we cannot reject the null of eﬃciency for these rates.
25deviation in ∆FSOe.62 With the exception of the ﬁrst few maturities the coeﬃcients on the
futures-spot spread are well above unity pointing to the lack of eﬃciency of the Eurodollar implied
rates, although based on the standard errors we cannot reject the null of forecasting eﬃciency. The
bottom panel of the Table, reports parameter estimates when the proxies for the time-varying term
premia are included in the regression. Following the inclusion of these controls, the coeﬃcients
on the futures-spot spread decline sharply, and they now only enter signiﬁcantly for the ﬁrst few
contracts, highlighting the lack of eﬃciency and presence of term premia in these rates. Importantly
for our analysis, the coeﬃcients on ∆FSOe, also decline notably after including the term premium
proxies, and now range between about 1 basis point and 45 basis points, with a peak coeﬃcient of
about 55 basis points at a forecast horizon of about 1-2/3 years (seventh Eurodollar contract).
As noted in Section 4, although changes in Eurodollar futures implied rates around FOMC an-
nouncements exhibit signiﬁcant correlation with the semantic scores, when the change is condi-
tioned on the monetary policy surprise, MP, such correlation is fairly limited. As a ﬁnal exercise
we re-estimate the model (58) using quotes taken after, rather than before the FOMC announce-
ments, to construct the futures-spot controls. In other words, we substitute fτn
t+ to fτn
t− in (58),
where t+ is 20 minutes after the FOMC announcement at date t. The results of this analysis are
shown in Tables 8 and 9, respectively, for the the federal funds and 3-month Libor rate models.
Comparing the regression coeﬃcients on ∆FSOe with those in Tables 6 and 7, it is apparent that
the point estimates are little aﬀected by the inclusion of futures quotes taken after, rather than
before, the release of the FOMC statement. Of course, one would expect futures quotes to contain
all relevant information to predict realized rates. However, based on the in-sample analysis, implied
rates do not appear to fully achieve such task, perhaps due to the presence of term premia. These
results appear to indicate that the common use by practitioners and in previous research litera-
ture (for example, G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson [2007]) of futures quotes to indirectly measure
the content of central bank communication could be somewhat limited, as these quotes might not
necessarily reﬂect all the information contained in the statements.
In conclusion, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant predictive content of changes in the semantic score FSOe, both in
the federal funds and Libor rate forecasting regressions, with a 1 standard deviation increase in the
FSOe score associated with a hump-shaped response of realized rates having a peak about 1-2/3
years out (model including term-premium controls). We also ﬁnd that the information of the FSOe
does not appear to be fully incorporated in futures quotes following the FOMC announcement. We
will ﬁnd a similar predictive performance of the FSOe score in Section 5.3, which considers a
multivariate (VAR) model speciﬁcation that includes the FSOe scores and federal funds rates, as
well as measures of inﬂation and economic activity. Before turning to that model, we interpret
the information in the FOMC statement and semantic score through the lens of a forward-looking
Taylor rule model.
62The unexpected policy rate decision once again only contains predictive power for very short horizons.
265.2 Taylor rule and automated scores
This Section’s goal is to assess the type of information contained in FOMC statements as measured
by the automated semantic scores. We ﬁrst estimate the parameters of a forward looking Taylor
rule model for the federal funds rate. Based on these estimates, we decompose realized values of
policy rates into two orthogonal components: 1) A systematic component, or “Taylor rule rate”,
which is the portion of the policy rate decision explained by forecasts of inﬂation and of output gap,
and 2) a residual component, which we refer to as the “interest rate gap”.63 We then compute cross-
correlations between the two components and the semantic score at diﬀerent leads and lags, and
study whether the automated scores hold a stronger correlation with either of the two components,
as well as the score’s leading properties. We then attempt to interpret the information contained
in the statements based on these correlation measures.
We consider a Taylor-rule speciﬁcation that incorporates partial interest rate adjustment, to account
for the observed sluggishness of policy rates (Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler [2000]). In addition, the
rule assumes a forward looking behavior of the central bank, by including forecasts, rather than
current realized measures of inﬂation and output gap, as determinants of interest rate decisions. As
shown by Orphanides [2001], real-time policy recommendations can diﬀer substantially from those
obtained using revised data. We therefore attempt to match the information set of FOMC members
as closely as possible by using the Greenbook forecasts for the GDP deﬂator and the output gap.
These forecasts are prepared by the staﬀ of the Federal Reserve Board ahead of each scheduled
FOMC meeting. The Greenbook forecasts are unfortunately only available to the public with a
5-year lag. We supplement the Greenbook forecasts starting in 2003 with forecasts of inﬂation
and real GDP from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), and of potential GDP from the
Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO). It is unlikely that these forecasts were a direct input of actual
policy decisions by FOMC members. However, because they were formed around the same time
in which the Greenbook forecasts were made, they were based on information sets similar to those
available to Board staﬀ ahead of FOMC meetings. In this sense we think of them as proxying the
true Greenbook forecasts.64
Measures of inﬂation and of the output gap display their most important ﬂuctuations at business
cycle frequencies. Because the time span starting in 1999 during which the automated scores are
deﬁned, only includes two business cycles (as deﬁned by the NBER), the parameters of the Taylor
rule are unlikely to be well identiﬁed on this sample. Given our two-step procedure, however, we
can decompose policy decisions since 1999 using parameter estimates obtained on a longer sample.
63As discussed below the Taylor rule model also includes as explanatory variables the lagged interest rate. This
term is not included in what we call “Taylor rule rate”.
64Additional detail on the data is available in Section 3. We closely follow Orphanides [2003] in using Greenbook
and SPF forecasts at mid-quarter. Prior to 1992, output concept to measure economic activity and inﬂation is GNP
and not GDP. Also the unit base year for the GNP/GDP measures change over the sample following those used by
the BEA in each. See the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia web-pages on “Real-time forecasts” for additional
detail. The CBO forecasts are only available twice a year, generally in the month February and August. The federal
funds rate is a quarterly average.
27Because monetary policy decisions under the Volcker chairmanship were arguably dominated by
idiosyncratic factors, we estimate parameters of the Taylor rule model between September 1987 and
December 2008, a period that covers the tenures of chairmen Greenspan and Bernanke. As for the
univariate forecasting regressions, we again focus the analysis on the FSOe score, which is deﬁned
on the extended set of antonymies using the Factiva corpus of text. The model speciﬁcation that
we use closely follows Orphanides [2003]:
it = α it−1 + β0 + βπ πa
t+3 + βπ ∆ya
t+3 + βy yt−1 + t, (10)
where it is the federal funds rate (quarterly average). The variable πa
t+3 is the 4-quarter inﬂation
forecast starting in t − 1. Because the BEA releases preliminary GDP estimates with a delay of
about 1-1/2 months, quarter t − 1 represents the one for which the most recent data are available
when the forecasts are formed at t. The variable yt−1 denotes the output gap at time t − 1 and
∆ya
t+3 = yt+3 − yt−1, is the forecast of the 4-quarter change in the output gap starting in quarter
t − 1. The “interest rate gap” is equal to the residual t, and we deﬁne the “Taylor rule rate” as
the predicted component of the rule with the exclusion of the lagged interest rate term:
iT
t ≡ β0 + βπ πa
t+3 + βy ∆ya
t+3 + βy yt−1.
The rule in (10) is more general than the one originally considered by Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler
[2000], unless the condition βπ = βy is satisﬁed. Linear least square estimation of the parameters
in (10) yields to:
ˆ i = .85[.04] it−1 − .11[.12] + .39[.09] πa
t+3 + .42[.06] ∆ya
t+3 + .22[.03] yt−1.
where the subscripts in square brackets denote Newey-West standard errors with a 4-quarter trun-
cation lag rule. The point estimates are consistent with those obtained by Orphanides [2003] among
others. The interest rate decision is characterized by a signiﬁcant degree of inertia, and the point
estimates on the inﬂation term guarantee stability in economies in which interest rates are set using
these forwarding looking rules.65 In addition, βπ is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from βy, supporting the
use of the more general speciﬁcation that includes the forecast of the growth rate of the output
gap.
After obtaining estimates for t and iT
t , we calculate the cross-correlation functions Corr(ˆ t,FSOt−J)
and Corr(ˆ iT
t ,FSOt−J), which are shown in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. As it can be seen from the
two ﬁgures, the semantic score, FSOe, displays rather strong correlations with both components
(about 70 percent). In other words, FOMC announcements contain information regarding policy
decisions based on changes in the outlook for inﬂation and economic activity (“Taylor rule rate”),
as well as other factors included in the “interest rate gap”. These factors are orthogonal to the
65More precisely, the price level is stable when the nominal interest rate, i, increases more than proportionally
with an increase in inﬂation (Clarida, Gal´ ı, and Gertler [2000]). The point estimates satisfy these condition as
βπ/(1 − α) = 2.6.
28systematic component by construction. The residual in the Taylor rule is often interpreted in the
literature as a shock to the preference of policy makers. This could be due to an imperfect observ-
ability of the state of the economy in real-time (Orphanides and Williams [2007]), or alternatively,
the weights given by the FOMC to its dual mandate of price stability and economic growth could
shift over time (for example, Boivin, Dong, and Ang [2008]). Alternatively, the residual can be
interpreted as omitted variables that aﬀect policy decisions and are uncorrelated with the system-
atic component. For example, Gertler and Karadi [2009] and Taylor [2008] have proposed rules
according to which central banks respond to ﬁnancial stress indicators to achieve monetary policy
objectives at times of limited pass-through of target policy rates on other yields. Although a casual
reading of the FOMC statements over the past 10-years seems to provide some support to both
interpretations, our semantic scores cannot distinguish among these alternatives.
Irrespective of the underlying determinant of the Taylor residuals, however, the cross-correlation
functions highlight another interesting feature of the linguistic measure. As it can be seen from
Figures 4 and 5, whereas the FSOe displays the highest correlation with the systematic component
of policy, iT
t , contemporaneously, the score leads the residual by about 1- to 2-quarters. Although,
our analysis does not identify reasons for policy deviations from the prescriptions of a “canoni-
cal” forward-looking Taylor rule, the results suggest that the FOMC communicates information
regarding such deviations with signiﬁcant lead before the actual policy rate decisions are taken.
Because longer-term yields (see Section 4) and other macroeconomic variables could respond to
such information, standard empirical monetary models considered in the literature (for example,
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [1999]) might incorrectly identify measures of monetary policy
shocks. The next section considers a small-scale VAR that includes a measure of communication.
5.3 Vector autoregression analysis
So far we have analyzed in univariate model speciﬁcations interest rate responses to shocks to the
semantic scores (Section 4), the predictive power of the scores for future realized rates (Section 5.1),
and the information content of scores as implied by a Taylor rule (Section 5.2). In this Section,
we revisit some of these results within a VAR multivariate framework. This model identiﬁes policy
shocks with a very diﬀerent approach and thus validates some results of the previous sections. In
addition, based on these identiﬁcation scheme, we can study interest rate responses to shocks in the
following months , and not just during the tight temporal windows around FOMC announcements
as in Section 4.
The VAR models include two monetary policy instruments: a policy interest rate (the federal
funds rate) and the Fed’s communication about future movements in the policy rate in the FOMC
statements. After presenting the model and the identiﬁcation for the monetary policy shocks, we
turn to a discussion of the impulse responses and the forecast error variance decompositions of
interest rates and real variables to unexpected innovations in the two instruments.
29Empirical speciﬁcation Our sample of analysis begins in May 1999 and ends in December
2008. In order to capture the response of Treasury yields at diﬀerent maturities to the same exact
policy shocks, while keeping the number of parameters low, we estimate six VAR models that
feature identical measures of inﬂation and economic activity, the federal funds rate and the FSOe
score. The speciﬁcations diﬀer for the maturity of the nominal yield included. More precisely, let
Yi
t = [Xt,St, Ri
t]0 denote the vector of variables in the VAR model i : Xt includes the 3-month
core-PCE inﬂation rate and the 3-month change in non-farm payroll employment; both variables
are reported as basis point changes expressed at an annual rate. The vector St denotes the policy
block composed of, in order, the semantic orientation score and the federal funds rate. Finally, Ri
t,
denote Treasury par-yields with maturities ranging between 3-months and 30-years. We refer to
the variables Zt = [Xt,St]0 as the “core” variables of the models.
The VAR models identify monetary policy shocks using a commonly used recursiveness assumption:
First, the change in the aggregate price level and in non-farm payroll employment, Xt, do not
respond contemporaneously to innovations in the policy block St and the yield Ri
t. Furthermore,
within the policy block, St, the semantic score is ordered ﬁrst, so that the federal funds rate
responds immediately to innovations in the score. We ﬁnd this ordering to be preferable to the
alternative of the federal funds rate being ordered ﬁrst in St. Following the discussion of Section
5.2, we interpret the FSOe as partially indicating a change in the preferences of policy makers,
such as a more hawkish stance towards inﬂation. The federal funds rate can respond immediately
to the FSOe when it is ordered ﬁrst in the VAR. Nevertheless, qualitatively the main ﬁndings in
this Section do not critically depend on the ordering of the two policy instruments within St.
Most of the VAR models considered in earlier literature to identify monetary policy shocks do not
include information regarding the term structure of nominal yields. In this respect, our model is
closely related to this literature in that we assume that innovations in the yields Ri
t’s do not aﬀect
any of the core variables, Zt, neither contemporaneously nor with a lag. Instead, the yield Ri
t can
respond contemporaneously to innovations in the core variables.66 The structural form of the VAR
models can be written as:
a[Xt,St,Ri
t]0 = A[Xt,St,Ri
























and the matrix σ is diagonal. The diagonal terms in the matrices a11 and a22 of (12) are equal to
66For a review of this literature, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [1999]. The speciﬁcation of the model
that we consider closely resembles that of Evans and Marshall [1998]. For a model, which, instead, uses information
on asset yields to identify monetary policy shocks see Piazzesi [2005].
30one, and the innovations X
t , S
t and Ri
t in (11) are the serially- and mutually-uncorrelated i.i.d.
structural shocks. It is important to note that, because of the zero elements in (12), the structural
shocks of the policy block S
t do not depend on the Treasury yield included in each VAR model.
In other words, each VAR model considered identiﬁes the same monetary policy shocks.67 Based
on the Akaike Information Criterion, we include six lags of the relevant variables in the model
speciﬁcations in (11), and because of the zero-restrictions in (12), we estimate the parameters in
(11) as a seemingly unrelated system.68
Results Figures 6 and 7 show responses of the core variables, Zt, to an unexpected one standard
deviation increase in the innovations to the FSOe score and the federal funds rate S
t. Figures 8
and 9 display Treasury yield responses to these shocks. All responses in the ﬁgures are absolute
deviations in basis points from the unshocked values, with the exception of the FSOe score, which
is reported as an absolute deviation in the (unscaled) units of the variable. In all ﬁgures, the
shaded areas represent two-standard error bootstrapped conﬁdence bands for the corresponding
impulse response.69 Before discussing the results, it is important to note that a positive innovation
to both variables can be interpreted as contractionary monetary policy shocks, whereas positive
innovations to the federal funds rate directly feed into higher short term rates, a positive innovation
to the linguistic score may aﬀect short term rates only in that it indicates a more “hawkish” stance
of policy.
Consider the response of the core variables to an unexpected positive shock to the FSOe score.
As shown in the bottom-right panel of Figure 6 the response of the federal funds rate is hump-
shaped with a peak of about 30 basis points about a year after the shock. The response of the
FSOe score (bottom-left panel) to its own innovation peaks almost immediately and then declines
monotonically, returning to its pre-shock level in less than a year. The responses of both core
inﬂation and employment growth to a shock in the semantic orientation score are in general not
statistically diﬀerent from zero likely due to the limited sample size (upper-panels). Following
a shock to the linguistic score, the core inﬂation rate falls a few basis points for the ﬁrst year.
The response of nonfarm payroll employment to a positive innovation to the FSOe score is quite
persistent. It is initially positive for a few months and it then turns negative after about 1-year.
Figure 7 reports responses of the core variables to an unexpected (positive) innovation in the
federal funds rate. As shown in the bottom panel, the response of the FSOe score is initially
slightly positive and then becomes negative after 6-months. This variation is economically small
and always remains within 5 percent of the in-sample standard deviation of the FSOe score. The
67Note that, as for the case of the high-frequency analysis of Section 4 the VAR model does not impose absence
of arbitrage opportunities across diﬀerent maturities in calculating the yield responses. Although interesting, these
restrictions are beyond the scope of this section.
68Ivanov and Kilian [2005] ﬁnd that, for monetary models of the sort considered here, the AIC provides the most
accurate estimate of impulse responses in small sample and data observed at a monthly frequency.
69To obtain the conﬁdence bands, we resample 1,000 times from the ﬁtted residuals of (11). The conﬁdence bands
are then constructed as the point estimates of the impulse response coeﬃcients plus/minus two standard deviations
of the impulse response coeﬃcients across the resampled datasets.
31response of the federal funds rate to its own innovation is very persistent: It is positive and then
becomes negative after about 2-years. As for the responses to innovations in the FSOe score, the
responses of core-inﬂation rate and nonfarm payroll employment to the federal funds rate shock
are also not statistically signiﬁcant.70 Even in the relatively short sample size, however, the model
estimates imply that an unexpected positive innovation in the semantic orientation score, that is,
an unexpectedly more hawkish FOMC statement, is followed by an increase in the federal funds rate
conﬁrming the results found in the univariate model analysis in Section 5.1. The response of short-
term interest rates to shocks to the FSOe score implied by the VAR and univariate model are very
similar at the 1-year horizon (about 30 basis points). Nonetheless, we note some diﬀerences in the
results of the two models, as the response of interest rates declines in the VAR, but increase further
for a couple of quarters in the univariate model. Some of these diﬀerences are likely attributable
to the very diﬀerent identiﬁcation schemes used in the two analyses.
We now turn to the forecast error variance decompositions of the core variables, which describe the
portion of the conditional k-step ahead forecast error variance of each variable that can be accounted
for by the innovation in the semantic orientation score and the federal funds rate. The estimated
variance decompositions are shown in Table 10.71 For each core variable, there are two columns in
the Table showing the portion of the variance accounted for by the semantic orientation score—
column FSOe in the Table—and the federal funds rate—column FR. As shown in the second-
to-last column, the shock to the linguistic score accounts for a signiﬁcant portion of the forecast
error variance of the federal funds rate with a maximum of about 45 percent 6- and 12-months out.
The variance of the federal funds rate accounted for by its own shock, instead, is monotonically
decreasing, with a maximum of about 55 percent at 3-months, and only about 25 percent 1-year
ahead. Interestingly the variance in the federal funds rate is largely accounted for by the FSOe
score at the 6- and 12-month horizon, indicating that at such horizon previous communication
plays a very important role. The variance of the semantic orientation score accounted for by its
own shock is monotonically decreasing and is quite large, with a maximum of about 90 percent
after three months and 55 percent 1-year ahead. The innovation of the federal funds rate, instead,
accounts for a negligible portion of the score variance at all forecasting horizons.72
70The growth rate of nonfarm payroll is initially positive, and then becomes negative after about 1-year. The
core inﬂation rate ﬂuctuates in the ﬁrst year following the shock, and then turns slightly negative after the ﬁrst
year. The sample considered in this analysis is relatively short and only includes a few business cycle ﬂuctuations.
It should not come as a surprise that the responses of the real variables to shocks to the FSO
e and federal funds
rate are imprecisely estimated. Arguably, their shapes do not closely resemble ﬁndings in previous related literature
that has analyzed a much longer data samples. The data sample analyzed in the literature that uses VAR models
to identify monetary policy shocks, typically starts in the early sixties and ends in the late nineties. In the VAR
analysis, we obtained similar results when using alternative measures of inﬂation—for example, headline—or output,
such as an index of industrial production. The inclusion of commodity price indices, which are often considered to
solve the “price puzzle”, also did not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the shape of the impulse responses. Finally, the responses of
core inﬂation and employment growth to a shock to the federal funds rate were similar when excluding the semantic
orientation score from the models.
71Bootstrapped standard errors of the point estimates are reported in square brackets below each corresponding
value.
72The portions of the variances of the core inﬂation rate and of the nonfarm payroll employment growth rate that is
32We now turn to the responses of Treasury yields to unexpected shocks to the semantic orientation
score, FSOe score, and the federal funds rate. As shown in Figure 8, yields at all maturities rise
on impact after a positive innovation to the FSOe score, with magnitudes that generally decline
with maturities. The responses of the 3-month and 6-month yields are hump-shaped with a peak
response of about 25 basis points 6- to 12-months; both responses are statistically diﬀerent from
zero for more than a year after the shock. The responses of yields at 2- and 5-year maturities
display a slight hump, with a peak at about 3-months of about 15 basis points, and are statistically
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero for somewhat less than 6-months. The responses of yields at the
longest maturities are never statistically diﬀerent from zero. The yield responses to a federal funds
rate shock are shown in Figure 9. The responses of the 3- and 6-months yield display a slight hump
and are larger in magnitude compared with the responses to a FSOe shock at short horizons.
Instead, all responses at maturities beyond two years are smaller in magnitude than for a FSOe
shock, and are never statically signiﬁcant. This pattern of more pronounced responses to policy
rate shocks at short-horizons and larger responses to FSOe shocks at longer maturities is analogous
to the high-frequency results of Section 4. The portion of the forecast error variance of the yields
accounted for by the FSOe and the fed funds rate shocks are reported in Table 11. The federal
funds rate shock account for 30 and 20 percent of the conditional variance, respectively, of the 3-
and 6-months yields at the 3-months horizon; the portion of the variance declines at longer horizons
for these two yields, and it is always tiny at longer maturities. The FSOe score shock, instead,
accounts for considerable conditional variation for yields with maturities of up to 5-year. For the
3- and 6-months maturities the portion of conditional variance explained is hump-shaped with a
peak of roughly 55 percent 6- to 12-months after the initial shock. At the 2- and 5-year maturities
the portion of the forecast variance is fairly stable for the ﬁrst 6-months at about 20 and 10 percent,
respectively.
In sum short-, medium-term Treasury yields and the federal funds rate increase after a shock to the
FSOe score. The responses of short-maturity Treasuries and the federal funds rate to these shocks
display signiﬁcant humps that peak at about 1-year after the shock. The responses of medium-term
Treasuries are less long lived. The FSOe score explains about half of the conditional variation of
these short-dated rates at the 1-year horizon. With the exception of the immediate responses of
short-term Treasury yields, our analysis indicates that central bank communication has been a
more important determinant of nominal rates than immediate policy rate decisions. In this sense,
words have been more important than actions for Treasury yields over this past decade.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we presented a novel approach to measure the content of central bank communication
regarding future policy rate decisions, and applied these measures to FOMC statements starting in
accounted for by either of the two monetary policy shocks are generally less than 5 percent at the diﬀerent horizons,
and the estimates are imprecise.
331999. These new measures rely on a branch of research in computer science and natural language
processing that has been rather untapped by economists. The approach of this paper, in particular,
has the advantage of being unsupervised, intuitive, and replicable across researchers.
Based on the linguistic measures, in high-frequency data we ﬁnd that while short-term Treasuries re-
spond to immediate (unexpected) policy rate decisions, longer-dated yields mainly react to changes
in the content of communication as measured by our semantic scores. In lower frequency data, we
ﬁnd that changes in communication predict future policy rate actions with a lead of more than a year
in univariate interest-rate forecasting models, in which shocks are identiﬁed using intra-day futures
quotes, and in a VAR model with shocks identiﬁed recursively using measures of economic activity
and inﬂation. The empirical results also show how changes in communication have been more
important than the contemporaneous setting of policy rates in determining longer-term nominal
yields. Based on a forward-looking Taylor rule decomposition, we also ﬁnd that FOMC announce-
ments contain signiﬁcant information regarding both the predicted and the residual component of
the rule-based interest rate decision. In addition, the semantic scores lead the rule-based policy
rate residual—or monetary policy shock—by a few quarters.
By emphasizing the role of central bank communication, rather than the immediate setting of
interest rates, our analysis highlights an important dimension of monetary policy that has received
only limited attention in the empirical literature on monetary economics. The importance of
communication in aﬀecting the term structure of nominal rates, along with the leading properties
of the semantic measures relative to rate decisions, suggests that monetary models used in earlier
literature—for example, canonical VARs as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans [1999]—might
have omitted an important measure when identifying monetary policy shocks.
Work in the economic and ﬁnance literature (such as G¨ urkaynak, Sack, and Swanson [2005]), as
well as central bankers and market practitioners, have generally proxied changes in central bank
communication indirectly through changes in market rates. While these measures reﬂect expecta-
tions of market participants, they are only an imperfect measure of such expectations because of
movements in term premia. While our semantic measures are quite correlated with futures implied
rates, especially at the one- to two-year horizon, the correlation between these measures is far
from perfect, and our ﬁndings seem to suggest that these quotes have only imperfectly reﬂected
the content of communication (as implied by our measure and our in-sample analysis), at least in
predicting future realized policy decisions.
In the paper we present measures of communication based on information from the Internet, ob-
tained via searches in Google, and from news sources included in the Dow Jones Factiva database.
While the Internet contains information by several order of magnitudes greater than what is ac-
cessible on news, our Google-based semantic measures only rely indirectly on such information in
using hit-counts on the search engine, rather than actual matches on the underlying text. Based
on our empirical results, and under the current state of technology, we ﬁnd that having a direct
34access and control of the information underlying the corpus of text, even if smaller, is very im-
portant. Indeed, our empirical ﬁndings suggest that the Factiva-based scores are estimated with a
signiﬁcantly greater precision as compared to the Google-based scores.
The information used to construct our semantic measures relies on commentaries by members of
the press, market practitioners, and investors. In this sense, our semantic measures could be used
as an alternative source of agents’ expectations and opinion to market instruments or surveys. The
semantic measures used in this paper could be of even more importance in other ﬁelds that lack such
alternative measures of average opinion. Investigations using the semantic scores could, for example,
be applied in the empirical validation of recent theoretical contributions aiming at understanding
the role of communication in the interaction between economic agents (such as Morris and Shin
[2007]). Applications outside policy announcements may range from the orientation of political
campaigns to communication between ﬁrms and investors.
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interest rate instruments is provided in Section 3.
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Notes: The lines in the chart show data on days of FOMC announcements after the release of the
statement. The Factiva Semantic Orientation score FSO
e based on the extended set of antonymies
is deﬁned in Equation (6). Information and deﬁnitions about the interest rate instruments is
provided in Section 3
Table 1: Correlation matrix of levels of interest rates and semantic scores.
Variable FFT ED4 GSOe GSOh FSOe FSOh
FFT 1.00
ED4 0.91 1.00
GSOe 0.18 0.40 1.00
GSOh 0.30 0.37 0.16 1.00
FSOe 0.14 0.37 0.86 0.22 1.00
FSOh 0.35 0.46 0.38 0.31 0.41 1.00
Notes: FFT denotes the target federal funds rate and ED4 the futures implied rate on the 4
th Eurodollar
quarterly contract. The remaining variables are levels of the Google- and Factiva-based semantic orien-





h). Values are measured on days of FOMC announcements after the release of the
statement. Total number of observations for interest rates, the GSO
e and FSO
e score is 84. The numbers
of observations for the GSO
h and FSO
h score are 82 and 68, respectively.
40Table 2: Summary measures for the variables included in the interest rate response high-frequency regres-
sions.
Change in Treasury yields
∆3-month ∆6-month ∆2-year ∆5-year ∆10-year ∆30-year
Mean −1.15 −1.43 −1.07 −0.08 0.02 0.34
Median 0.00 −0.25 0.00 0.00 −0.20 −0.20
StDev 4.75 5.01 6.53 5.81 4.52 3.81
Min −23.30 −24.30 −23.30 −18.74 −14.24 −6.50
Max 9.00 8.00 21.55 22.88 16.16 14.00
Change in Eurodollar futures rates
∆ED1 ∆ED4 ∆ED6 ∆ED8
Mean −1.57 −2.21 −1.97 −1.50
Median −0.45 −1.75 −1.50 −1.00
StDev 7.64 8.52 8.16 7.70
Min −38.00 −30.50 −29.50 −29.50
Max 17.75 24.50 25.00 25.50
Monetary policy surprise and change in Semantic Scores
MP ∆GSOe ∆GSOh ∆FSOe ∆FSOh
Mean −2.24 −0.01 −0.01 0.03 −0.14
Median −0.15 −0.01 −0.01 0.00 −0.34
StDev 9.85 0.29 0.46 0.41 1.19
Min −46.50 −0.77 −1.50 −1.01 −2.38
Max 13.50 0.98 1.39 1.19 3.90
NoObs 82 82 80 82 58
Notes: Number of observations for Treasury yields and Eurodollar futures rates is: 82. For
interest rates, numbers are expressed as basis point changes during narrow temporal windows
around FOMC announcements. Treasury yields are for the on-the-run issues. ED1-8 are
future-implied rates on the nearest-eight quarterly Eurodollar futures contract. MP is the
monetary policy surprise calculated as a (rescaled) diﬀerence in the current-month federal
funds futures contract. ∆GSO
e is the change in semantic orientation score deﬁned on the
“extended ”set of antynomies on Google data; ∆GSO
h uses the “hawkish-dovish ”antynomy
on Google data (see Section 2.1 for more detail). The scores ∆FSO
e and ∆FSOh are deﬁned
accordingly but use data from Factiva (see equation 6).
41Table 3: Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables included in the interest rate response high-
frequency regressions.
Variable MP ∆GSOh ∆GSOe ∆FSOh ∆FSOe
MP 1.00
∆GSOh −0.02 1.00
∆GSOe 0.26 −0.07 1.00
∆FSOh 0.00 0.30 −0.02 1.00
∆FSOe 0.08 −0.07 −0.21 0.11 1.00
Notes: For variable deﬁnitions and number of observa-
tions included refer to Table 2.
42Table 4: Regression Results for Treasury Yields
∆Score: None ∆HI ∆GSOh ∆FSOh ∆GSOe ∆FSOe
Dependent Variable: ∆3-month yield
MP 0.33 0.32 0.15 0.19 0.16 0.25
[0.11]∗∗∗ [0.11]∗∗∗ [0.11] [0.13] [0.11] [0.12]∗∗
∆Score 0.00 −0.57 0.03 0.00 −0.33 0.68
[0.00] [0.53] [0.34] [0.48] [0.42] [0.54]
R2 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.47
Dependent Variable: ∆6-month yield
MP 0.34 0.34 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.28
[0.11]∗∗∗ [0.11]∗∗∗ [0.14]∗ [0.14]∗ [0.14]∗ [0.12]∗∗
∆Score 0.00 −0.37 0.76 0.44 −0.65 1.18
[0.00] [0.66] [0.48] [0.48] [0.50] [0.53]∗∗
R2 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.41 0.46 0.47
Dependent Variable: ∆2-year yield
MP 0.27 0.27 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.22
[0.11]∗∗ [0.12]∗∗ [0.11] [0.13] [0.12]∗ [0.10]∗∗
∆Score 0.00 0.41 1.98 1.82 −1.05 2.28
[0.00] [0.70] [0.78]∗∗ [0.63]∗∗∗ [0.94] [0.88]∗∗∗
R2 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.17 0.21
Dependent Variable: ∆5-year yield
MP 0.07 0.08 −0.00 −0.01 0.05 0.05
[0.09] [0.10] [0.10] [0.11] [0.12] [0.10]
∆Score 0.00 0.48 2.12 1.78 −1.14 1.66
[0.00] [0.63] [0.97]∗∗ [0.75]∗∗ [0.86] [0.84]∗∗
R2 0.02 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.04
Dependent Variable: ∆10-year yield
MP −0.01 −0.01 −0.07 −0.09 −0.04 −0.03
[0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.09] [0.07]
∆Score 0.00 0.40 1.70 1.12 −0.92 0.98
[0.00] [0.52] [0.84]∗∗ [0.66]∗ [0.69] [0.64]
R2 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.01
Dependent Variable: ∆30-year yield
MP −0.12 −0.11 −0.13 −0.16 −0.12 −0.13
[0.06]∗∗ [0.06]∗ [0.04]∗∗∗ [0.05]∗∗∗ [0.05]∗∗ [0.05]∗∗
∆Score 0.00 0.73 0.75 0.74 −0.23 0.46
[0.00] [0.46] [0.59] [0.57] [0.48] [0.56]
R2 0.09 0.13 0.11 0.20 0.09 0.10
N. Obs. 82 82 80 58 82 82
p-val. 3m=2y . 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.39 0.02
p-val. 2y=30y . 0.62 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.00
Notes: Treasury yield responses during narrow temporal windows around FOMC announcements. Dependent variables are
changes in Treasury yields at diﬀerent maturities (horizontal panels). The dependent variables are the monetary policy surprise
(MP), the change in the linguistic scores (columns), and a constant (not reported). Changes in interest rates are expressed
in basis points and the standard deviations of the linguistic scores are normalized to one. See the footnote to Table 2 for
variable deﬁnitions. The p-val. 3m=2y (2y=30y) is the p-value for the null that the 3-month and 2-year (2-year and 30-year)
yield responses to the linguistic scores are identical. See Section 4 for detail about the calculation of the standard errors. ***
signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *signiﬁcant at 10%.Table 5: Regression Results for Eurodollar futures rates
∆Score: None ∆HI ∆GSOh ∆FSOh ∆GSOe ∆FSOe
Dependent Variable: ∆ED1 futures rate
MP 0.59 0.59 0.54 0.54 0.58 0.54
[0.12]∗∗∗ [0.12]∗∗∗ [0.15]∗∗∗ [0.16]∗∗∗ [0.17]∗∗∗ [0.14]∗∗∗
∆Score 0.00 −0.50 2.11 1.55 −1.04 −0.28
[0.00] [0.64] [0.97]∗∗ [0.69]∗∗ [0.99] [1.14]
R2 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.59
Dependent Variable: ∆ED2 futures rate
MP 0.52 0.52 0.45 0.46 0.50 0.48
[0.11]∗∗∗ [0.12]∗∗∗ [0.15]∗∗∗ [0.15]∗∗∗ [0.17]∗∗∗ [0.13]∗∗∗
∆Score 0.00 0.02 2.36 1.97 −0.85 0.64
[0.00] [0.69] [1.04]∗∗ [0.69]∗∗∗ [1.01] [1.05]
R2 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.52 0.45 0.45
Dependent Variable: ∆ED4 futures rate
MP 0.38 0.38 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.33
[0.13]∗∗∗ [0.14]∗∗∗ [0.15]∗ [0.16] [0.18]∗ [0.14]∗∗
∆Score 0.00 0.84 2.79 2.04 −1.11 2.02
[0.00] [0.93] [1.23]∗∗ [0.85]∗∗ [1.22] [0.88]∗∗
R2 0.19 0.20 0.27 0.25 0.19 0.21
Dependent Variable: ∆ED6 futures rate
MP 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.20 0.25 0.26
[0.12]∗∗ [0.13]∗∗ [0.13] [0.15] [0.17] [0.13]∗∗
∆Score 0.00 1.03 2.88 1.83 −1.31 1.82
[0.00] [0.86] [1.28]∗∗ [0.95]∗ [1.24] [0.97]∗
R2 0.14 0.15 0.24 0.20 0.14 0.15
Dependent Variable: ∆ED8 futures rate
MP 0.23 0.24 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.20
[0.11]∗∗ [0.13]∗ [0.13] [0.14] [0.16] [0.12]
∆Score 0.00 1.19 2.74 1.59 −1.58 1.52
[0.00] [0.82] [1.29]∗∗ [0.95]∗ [1.23] [0.94]
R2 0.09 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.10 0.10
N. Obs. 82 82 80 58 82 82
p-val. ED1=ED8 . 0.01 0.31 0.96 0.60 0.25
Notes: Eurodollar futures implied rates responses during narrow temporal windows around FOMC
announcements. Dependent variables are changes in Eurodollar implied rates at diﬀerent maturities
(horizontal panels). The dependent variables are the monetary policy surprise (MP), the change in
the linguistic scores (columns), and a constant (not reported). Changes in interest rates are expressed
in basis points and the standard deviations of the linguistic scores are normalized to one. See the
footnote to Table 2 for variable deﬁnitions. The p-val. ED1=ED8 is the p-value for the null that the
ﬁrst and eighth Eurodollar rate responses to the linguistic scores are identical. See Section 4 for detail
about the calculation of the standard errors. *** signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, *signiﬁcant
at 10%.Table 6: Federal funds rate forecasting regression






+ β2MPt + β3∆FSOe
t + γXt− + ε
τFF
t
FF: FF2 FF3 FF4 FF5 FF6






1.07 1.13 1.19 1.23 1.28
[0.10]∗∗∗ [0.12]∗∗∗ [0.12]∗∗∗ [0.16]∗∗∗ [0.19]∗∗∗
MP 0.75 0.60 0.57 0.68 0.84
[0.24]∗∗∗ [0.39] [0.45] [0.48] [0.51]
∆FSOe 4.72 11.55 14.52 19.30 23.32
[1.99]∗∗ [4.06]∗∗∗ [5.03]∗∗∗ [6.54]∗∗∗ [7.83]∗∗∗
R2 0.86 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.74






0.88 0.91 1.00 1.07 1.15
[0.08]∗∗∗ [0.11]∗∗∗ [0.14]∗∗∗ [0.20]∗∗∗ [0.24]∗∗∗
MP 0.68 0.42 0.34 0.41 0.58
[0.20]∗∗∗ [0.32] [0.38] [0.42] [0.46]
∆FSOe 2.94 8.35 10.81 15.59 20.46
[1.72]∗ [3.00]∗∗∗ [3.69]∗∗∗ [5.83]∗∗∗ [7.57]∗∗∗
NBER rec. dummy −14.65 −39.68 −44.40 −43.99 −36.52
[7.11]∗∗ [12.12]∗∗∗ [15.19]∗∗∗ [23.12]∗ [32.93]
10y-2y slope 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.13
[0.01] [0.03]∗∗ [0.04]∗∗ [0.06]∗∗ [0.07]∗
BBB cred. spread −5.44 −2.07 −1.76 −1.40 −1.53
[3.68] [5.34] [6.20] [7.38] [9.14]
R2 0.89 0.85 0.84 0.82 0.78
N. Obs. 82 82 82 82 82
Notes: The columns in the Table report estimates of the model using quotes on the
second (FF2) through the sixth (FF6) fed funds contract, which, given the schedule
of FOMC meeting, correpond to forecasting horizons of about 1- to 5-months. The
dependent variable (rt+τFF − rt−) is the spread between the ex-post realized monthly
average of the federal funds on each futures contracts’ settlement month, rt+τFF , and
the intended fed funds rate ahead of the FOMC announcement t
−. The independent






, the monetary policy surprise, MPt, and the change in the Factiva
semantic score, ∆FSO
e
t. Panel B includes three term premium controls measured ahead
of the FOMC announcement: a dummy variable for NBER-dated recessions, the 10- to
2-year slope of the Treasury curve, and the 10-year BBB-rated corporate credit spread
to Treasuries. All interest rates are expressed in basis points and the standard deviation
of the linguistic scores is normalized to one. Newey-West standard errors with weighting
and a truncation lag of 1-1/2 times each corresponding forecasting horizon reported in
square brackets. For additional detail refer to Section 5.1. *** signiﬁcant at 1%, **
signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%.
45Table 7: Eurodollar futures rate forecasting regression






+ β2MPt + β3∆FSOe
t + γXt− + ε
τED
t
ED: ED1 ED2 ED3 ED4 ED5 ED6 ED7 ED8






1.09 1.29 1.34 1.25 1.29 1.40 1.50 1.67
[0.19]∗∗∗ [0.22]∗∗∗ [0.25]∗∗∗ [0.34]∗∗∗ [0.35]∗∗∗ [0.37]∗∗∗ [0.38]∗∗∗ [0.38]∗∗∗
MP 1.20 0.85 0.42 1.95 2.68 3.11 4.82 4.21
[0.41]∗∗∗ [0.69] [1.23] [1.04]∗ [1.24]∗∗ [1.53]∗∗ [2.43]∗ [2.58]
∆FSOe 3.60 22.70 25.53 36.22 45.30 51.70 64.18 71.14
[2.88] [8.28]∗∗∗ [8.29]∗∗∗ [10.14]∗∗∗ [11.39]∗∗∗ [16.39]∗∗∗ [20.08]∗∗∗ [16.36]∗∗∗
R2 0.70 0.58 0.48 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.44






0.94 1.06 0.68 0.37 0.29 0.37 0.28 −0.30
[0.22]∗∗∗ [0.25]∗∗∗ [0.34]∗ [0.31] [0.41] [0.41] [0.49] [1.12]
MP 1.04 0.66 0.27 0.70 0.79 −0.01 0.44 −1.68
[0.46]∗∗ [0.63] [0.85] [0.51] [0.67] [0.86] [2.05] [1.01]
∆FSOe 1.37 21.53 17.86 23.38 30.91 35.10 53.71 47.42
[3.44] [10.71]∗∗ [7.06]∗∗ [5.60]∗∗∗ [8.14]∗∗∗ [8.75]∗∗∗ [9.08]∗∗∗ [10.32]∗∗∗
Recession Dummy −17.59 −4.88 −5.82 18.97 −0.07 −20.53 −64.53 −101.51
[15.03] [44.13] [61.76] [59.08] [77.56] [86.89] [69.48] [37.27]∗∗∗
10y-2y slope 0.04 0.13 0.36 0.67 0.87 1.07 1.36 2.06
[0.04] [0.10] [0.18]∗ [0.24]∗∗∗ [0.28]∗∗∗ [0.25]∗∗∗ [0.32]∗∗∗ [0.81]∗∗
BBB cred. spread −4.83 −19.76 −89.15 −198.91 −235.34 −271.22 −264.06 −241.38
[6.23] [10.24]∗ [22.89]∗∗∗ [45.27]∗∗∗ [55.10]∗∗∗ [60.42]∗∗∗ [60.73]∗∗∗ [61.30]∗∗∗
R2 0.73 0.63 0.64 0.70 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.78
N. Obs. 82 82 81 78 76 74 72 69
Notes: The columns in the Table report estimates of the model using quotes on the ﬁrst (ED1) through the eighth (ED8)
Eurodollar futures contract, which, given the schedule of FOMC meeting, correpond to forecasting horizons of about 1-1/2 to
11-1/2 months. The dependent variable (rt+τED − rt−) is the spread between the ex-post realized Libor rate on each futures
contract settlement day, t + τED, and the intended fed funds rate ahead of the FOMC announcement, t
−. The independent






, the monetary policy
surprise, MPt, and the change in the Factiva semantic score, ∆FSO
e
t. Panel B includes three term premium controls measured
ahead of the FOMC announcement: a dummy variable for NBER-dated recessions, the 10- to 2-year slope of the Treasury
curve, and the 10-year BBB-rated corporate credit spread to Treasuries. All interest rates are expressed in basis points and the
standard deviation of the linguistic scores is normalized to one. Newey-West standard errors with weighting and a truncation
lag of 1-1/2 times each corresponding forecasting horizon reported in square brackets. For additional detail refer to Section 5.1.
*** signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%.
46Table 8: Federal funds rate forecasting regression using after-announcement futures rates f
τFF
t+






+ β2MPt + β3∆FSOe
t + γXt− + ε
τFF
t
FF: FF2 FF3 FF4 FF5 FF6






1.07 1.12 1.18 1.23 1.29
[0.08]∗∗∗ [0.10]∗∗∗ [0.10]∗∗∗ [0.13]∗∗∗ [0.17]∗∗∗
MP −0.09 −0.12 −0.08 0.04 0.15
[0.28] [0.43] [0.49] [0.54] [0.52]
∆FSOe 4.79 11.50 14.22 18.72 21.89
[2.27]∗∗ [4.21]∗∗∗ [5.11]∗∗∗ [6.60]∗∗∗ [7.59]∗∗∗
R2 0.85 0.80 0.79 0.77 0.75






0.88 0.90 0.99 1.07 1.17
[0.08]∗∗∗ [0.11]∗∗∗ [0.13]∗∗∗ [0.19]∗∗∗ [0.23]∗∗∗
MP 0.01 −0.15 −0.19 −0.13 −0.03
[0.21] [0.35] [0.42] [0.48] [0.46]
∆FSOe 3.11 8.48 10.75 15.39 19.38
[2.02] [3.18]∗∗∗ [3.79]∗∗∗ [5.90]∗∗ [7.25]∗∗∗
NBER rec. dummy −14.88 −38.96 −44.13 −42.47 −35.24
[8.11]∗ [13.75]∗∗∗ [17.04]∗∗ [24.20]∗ [32.73]
10y-2y slope 0.02 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.13
[0.02] [0.03]∗∗ [0.04]∗∗ [0.06]∗∗ [0.07]∗
BBB cred. spread −4.90 −1.71 −0.91 −0.60 −0.55
[4.25] [5.88] [6.87] [7.93] [9.38]
R2 0.88 0.85 0.84 0.81 0.79
N. Obs. 82 82 82 82 82
Notes: This Table reports parameter estimates for the model of Table 6 when con-







. For additional detail about the model speciﬁcation
refer to the footnote to Table 6. *** signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant
at 10%.
47Table 9: Eurodollar futures rate forecasting regression






+ β2MPt + β3∆FSOe
t + γXt− + ε
τED
t
ED: ED1 ED2 ED3 ED4 ED5 ED6 ED7 ED8






1.09 1.34 1.41 1.29 1.32 1.42 1.52 1.70
[0.21]∗∗∗ [0.21]∗∗∗ [0.24]∗∗∗ [0.33]∗∗∗ [0.34]∗∗∗ [0.36]∗∗∗ [0.37]∗∗∗ [0.36]∗∗∗
MP 0.57 0.01 −0.32 1.46 2.28 2.83 4.43 3.92
[0.52] [0.65] [1.23] [1.03] [1.24]∗ [1.47]∗ [2.26]∗ [2.43]
∆FSOe 4.51 21.14 21.73 31.96 41.21 48.01 60.04 67.18
[2.61]∗ [9.00]∗∗ [7.90]∗∗∗ [9.97]∗∗∗ [11.44]∗∗∗ [16.07]∗∗∗ [20.08]∗∗∗ [16.38]∗∗∗
R2 0.69 0.58 0.50 0.39 0.39 0.42 0.45 0.44






0.95 1.14 0.78 0.41 0.31 0.37 0.28 −0.32
[0.27]∗∗∗ [0.25]∗∗∗ [0.34]∗∗ [0.31] [0.43] [0.43] [0.48] [1.06]
MP 0.49 0.01 −0.16 0.54 0.70 −0.04 0.39 −1.66
[0.57] [0.59] [0.94] [0.53] [0.59] [0.81] [1.95] [1.09]
∆FSOe 2.18 20.79 15.54 21.98 29.91 34.54 53.35 48.07
[3.15] [10.89]∗ [6.57]∗∗ [5.31]∗∗∗ [7.44]∗∗∗ [8.35]∗∗∗ [9.05]∗∗∗ [9.16]∗∗∗
NBER rec. dummy −20.84 −5.58 −2.72 21.44 2.03 −19.01 −62.35 −103.60
[14.91] [40.22] [59.78] [59.07] [79.10] [87.58] [72.28] [30.52]∗∗∗
10y-2y slope 0.04 0.12 0.33 0.65 0.86 1.07 1.36 2.08
[0.04] [0.10] [0.18]∗ [0.24]∗∗∗ [0.29]∗∗∗ [0.26]∗∗∗ [0.32]∗∗∗ [0.77]∗∗∗
BBB cred. spread −2.10 −15.03 −85.98 −196.97 −234.18 −270.64 −263.42 −241.79
[8.51] [11.37] [22.58]∗∗∗ [45.67]∗∗∗ [55.69]∗∗∗ [60.59]∗∗∗ [60.31]∗∗∗ [59.86]∗∗∗
R2 0.72 0.63 0.64 0.70 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.78
N. Obs. 82 82 81 78 76 74 72 69
Notes: This Table reports parameter estimates for the model of Table 7 when controlling for level of the futures rate in the






. For additional detail about the model
speciﬁcation refer to the footnote to Table 7. *** signiﬁcant at 1%, ** signiﬁcant at 5%, * signiﬁcant at 10%.
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Notes: The solid line represents the correlation coeﬃcient between the
Taylor-rule residual, deﬁned in Section 5.2, and the Factiva Semantic Orien-
tation score at diﬀerent leads/lags FSO
e
t±J, with the unit interval deﬁned as
a quarter. Shaded areas represent two asymptotic standard-error conﬁdence
bands around the estimated correlations at each lead/lag.
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Notes: The solid line represents the correlation coeﬃcient between the pre-
dicted Taylor-rule rate, deﬁned in Section 5.2, and the Factiva Semantic
Orientation score at diﬀerent leads/lags FSO
e
t±J, with the unit interval de-
ﬁned as a quarter. Shaded areas represent two asymptotic standard-error
conﬁdence bands around the estimated correlations at each lead/lag.
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Notes: The shock is identiﬁed in a recursive VAR with the “core” variables ordered as: inﬂation, em-
ployment, FSO
e score, federal funds rate. The VAR also includes Treasury yields, which do not identify
the shock because of parameter restrictions. See Section 5.3 for additional detail. Shaded areas denote
two-standard error bootstrapped conﬁdence bands.
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Notes: The shock is identiﬁed in a recursive VAR with the “core” variables ordered as: inﬂation, em-
ployment, FSO
e score, federal funds rate. The VAR also includes Treasury yields, which do not identify
the shock because of parameter restrictions. See Section 5.3 for additional detail. Shaded areas denote
two-standard error bootstrapped conﬁdence bands.
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Notes: The shock is identiﬁed in a recursive VAR with the “core” variables ordered as: inﬂation, em-
ployment, FSO
e score, federal funds rate. Each impulse response corresponds to a diﬀerent VAR model
which, in addition to the “core variables”, includes a diﬀerent yield ordered last. Parameter restrictions
are set such that the yield does not identify the shock and the shock is the same across speciﬁcations. See
Section 5.3 for additional detail. Shaded areas denote two-standard error bootstrapped conﬁdence bands.
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Notes: The shock is identiﬁed in a recursive VAR with the “core” variables ordered as: inﬂation, em-
ployment, FSO
e score, federal funds rate. Each impulse response corresponds to a diﬀerent VAR model
which, in addition to the “core” variables, includes a diﬀerent yield ordered last. Parameter restrictions
are set such that the yield does not identify the shock, and the shock is the same across speciﬁcations. See
Section 5.3 for additional detail. Shaded areas denote two-standard error bootstrapped conﬁdence bands.
51Table 10: Forecast error variance decomposition for the “core”variables in the VAR model
Variable Inﬂation Employment FSOe FFR
Shock FSOe FFR FSOe FFR FSOe FFR FSOe FFR
Months Ahead
3 0.2 0.0 0.8 3.6 90.0 0.7 34.9 55.2
[1.7] [1.6] [1.9] [3.4] [7.7] [2.1] [10.0] [9.8]
6 1.0 1.3 5.0 4.6 74.9 1.7 44.8 38.9
[3.9] [3.5] [7.4] [5.6] [12.3] [4.2] [13.3] [12.0]
12 1.1 1.5 4.4 3.1 54.4 1.3 45.1 23.1
[4.4] [3.5] [8.7] [4.9] [14.6] [3.8] [16.1] [11.6]
24 1.1 1.5 4.3 3.0 45.6 3.6 28.6 11.1
[4.8] [3.3] [8.6] [4.3] [14.3] [4.5] [17.0] [9.2]
36 1.6 1.7 11.3 5.7 47.3 6.8 21.9 8.7
[4.9] [3.2] [9.6] [5.1] [14.5] [5.5] [16.1] [8.4]
Notes: For detail about the model speciﬁcation refer to the footnote to
Figure 6. The columns report the variance of the core variables explained
by the shock to the federal funds rate (FFR) and the Factiva semantic
orientation score (FSO
e). Numbers are expressed as percentage points.
Bootstrapped standard errors reported in brackets.
Table 11: Forecast error variance decomposition for Treasury yields in the VAR models
Maturity 3-month 6-month 2-year 5-year 10-year 30-year
Shock FSOe FFR FSOe FFR FSOe FFR FSOe FFR FSOe FFR FSOe FFR
Months Ahead
3 37.9 29.6 37.6 21.5 20.6 2.3 10.0 0.1 3.2 1.7 0.3 1.6
[10.1] [9.4] [10.1] [8.6] [9.6] [4.2] [7.9] [2.4] [5.2] [3.1] [3.0] [2.6]
6 58.5 21.5 54.0 16.7 23.7 1.9 10.6 0.3 4.0 1.8 1.3 1.5
[12.7] [9.9] [12.5] [9.1] [11.9] [5.5] [8.6] [3.9] [6.0] [4.1] [4.3] [3.6]
12 54.0 16.3 44.6 12.2 13.2 1.7 4.7 0.8 2.9 1.7 6.1 1.1
[16.0] [10.3] [15.2] [8.8] [11.4] [5.6] [7.0] [4.8] [5.4] [5.0] [7.1] [4.4]
24 32.8 8.8 25.3 6.1 5.6 0.8 2.0 0.7 1.6 1.7 4.8 1.2
[17.1] [8.4] [15.7] [6.6] [12.0] [4.9] [8.8] [5.0] [7.7] [5.9] [8.3] [5.6]
36 25.7 7.2 20.2 5.5 5.8 1.7 2.0 0.7 1.3 1.4 3.7 1.0
[16.3] [7.7] [15.1] [6.2] [11.7] [5.0] [9.3] [4.6] [8.8] [5.6] [9.2] [5.7]
Notes: For detail about the model speciﬁcation refer to the footnote to Figure 8. The columns report
the variance of the yields explained by the shock to the federal funds rate (FFR) and the Factiva
semantic orientation score (FSO
e). Numbers are expressed as percentage points. Bootstrapped
standard errors reported in brackets.
52